Problem #2 Consider two potential choices A and B. Assume that the prior belief is that the probability that A > B is equal to p > ]. Furthermore, imagine that there are N individuals who decide between A and B. Furthermore, imagine that all individuals receive signals that reveal the truth with probability q>p. i) Imagine that individuals act simultaneously. Characterize the choices of the individuals depending on the signals drawn. ii) Now, assume that agent 1 receives B as her signal and all other agents receive A as their signal. Imagine that individuals move in a sequence with individual 1 moving first. What is the choice of the first agent? iii) What is the choice of the second agent? iv) Is at a good idea for the second agent to wait - in general - for agent 1 to make her move first? v) What can the third agent conclude about the signal of the second agent? vi) Is there any advantage for agent 3 to wait and allow agent 2 to move before her? Problem #2 Consider two potential choices A and B. Assume that the prior belief is that the probability that A > B is equal to p > ]. Furthermore, imagine that there are N individuals who decide between A and B. Furthermore, imagine that all individuals receive signals that reveal the truth with probability q>p. i) Imagine that individuals act simultaneously. Characterize the choices of the individuals depending on the signals drawn. ii) Now, assume that agent 1 receives B as her signal and all other agents receive A as their signal. Imagine that individuals move in a sequence with individual 1 moving first. What is the choice of the first agent? iii) What is the choice of the second agent? iv) Is at a good idea for the second agent to wait - in general - for agent 1 to make her move first? v) What can the third agent conclude about the signal of the second agent? vi) Is there any advantage for agent 3 to wait and allow agent 2 to move before her