Problem 2: Now, think about the same market (and the same cost structure) as in task 1, and assume N = 2 (duopoly). However, assume for this task that the firms choose prices and not quantities. The price decisions are made simultaneously. Since the minivans are identical, the consumers choose the cheapest minivan. If both firms choose same prices, the consumers are indifferent which minivan to buy. In this case each consumer randomizes and buys a minivan from one of the firms with probability }- Show carefully that it is a Nash equilibrium for both firms to choose p = MC. Hint: Remember that a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from the given strategy profile. With other words, if the other player plays her part of the Nash equilibrium, the player would not like to do something different than what is prescribed by the equilibrium.There are N (identical) minivan manufacturers in France. Denote by y, the production of the manufacturer i = 1, ... N. The cost function of each minivan manufacturer is C(y;) = 10y;. The inverse demand for the minivans is p(( ) = 1000 - y where y is the aggregate supply. Assume that only manufacturers located in France supply the minivans for the local market and all production decisions are made simultaneously