Problem 2. Suppose there are two beer companies. One produces a beer that has a high alcohol content (ABV 10%), while the other company produces a light beer that has a low ABV (5%). Assume there are 50 consumers whose preferences for alcohol content (ABV) are uniformly distributed between 5% and 10%. Consumers all value drinking a beer their ideal beer at $10 but dislike a beer with a different ABV than their ideal ABV by $1 per percentage point. That is, if I prefer a beer with 6% ABV and I drink the light beer, my utility will be $1 lower. If I prefer a beer with 5.5% and I drink the light beer my utility will be $0.50 lower. Marginal cost is the same for both companies and is equal to $1. The two companies compete by choosing prices simultaneously. 1. What is the utility of purchasing the low ABV beer for a consumer whose preferred beer contains :3 ABV? where p; is the price of the light beer. 2. What is the utility of purchasing the high ABV beer for a consumer whose preferred beer contains a: ABV'? 3. Find an expression for the \"location\" of marginal consumer given p; and pk. In other words, given prices, what is the ABV preference for a consumer who is indifferent between consuming the light beer and the heavy beer. Call this function 2:7\"(pi, pk). 4. What happens to the \"location\" of the marginal consumer as the price of the heavy beer increases? 5. Using this expression, what is the demand curve for the two beers? 6. What is the prot function for each rm? 7. What is the best response function of each rm? 8. Solve for the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in prices. What are prots in this equilibrium