Problem 3. Business Factory Inc. [BFI] is in the process of hiring workers to ll some positions after a series of layoffs. It needs workers for regular positions and workers for high-layel managerial positions. All workers hired by BFI stay employed at the rm approximately 10 years. In that time. workers in regular positions will be paid wR = 100 thousand per year, while workers in managerial positions will be paid WM = 250 thousand per year. In the pool of potential workers there are some who don't care at all about business management [lowinterest], and there are some who enjoy that sort of thing {highinterest}. BFI would like to hire highinterest workers for its managerial positions, and low-interest workers for the regular positions. Howeyer, the rm can't tell the two types of workers apart. If the rm simply posts adyert'isements for the job yacancies, then there's a risk that lowinterest indiyiduals could lie on their resumes, \"mimicking\" those with high-interest. A consultant suggests that the rm should setup an entry interyiew process or quiz that workers haye to pass in order to be hired at a managerial position. To pass this exam, workers can receiye training at a business school. The consultant belieyes that lowinterest workers will need to train for 3 years at the school in order to pass the exam, while high-interest workers can do it in only 2 years. The yearly tuition at this school is C [for both types of workers}. It] Propose a yalue of C1 that would make workers correctly identify their own type {low or high interest] when applying for a yacancy. What is this kind of equilibrium called? B] Propose a yalue of C: that would make low-interest workers willing and able to \"mimic\" high-interest workers. Then, propose a C3 that would make high-interest workers willing and able to mimic low-interest workers. What are these type of eouilibriums called