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Problem 4. Consider the following imperfect information game. Notice that both play- ers have two information sets. 5,2 1 a b 2 t 1
Problem 4. Consider the following imperfect information game. Notice that both play- ers have two information sets. 5,2 1 a b 2 t 1 d d 4,3 6.0 4,6 0,4 6,0 (a) Find all subgame perfect Nash equilibria in behaviour strategies. (b) Can you find behaviour strategies, b - = ((p, 1 p), (q, 1 q)) and - b = ((r, 1 r), (t, 1 t)), under which each terminal node is reached with probability ?
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To find all subgame perfect Nash equilibria in behavioral strategies for the given imperfect information game we need to analyze each players strategy at every information set and ensure that these st...
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Microeconomics An Intuitive Approach with Calculus
Authors: Thomas Nechyba
1st edition
538453257, 978-0538453257
