Problem 5 Lemon's problem (12 points) Consider the market for used cars. The overall population of used cars is a fraction p plums and a fraction 1 p lemons. Used car sellers value plums at $2,000 and lemons at $1,000. Used car buyers value plums at $2,400 and lemons at $1,200. There is asymmetric information. The seller of a car knows the type of the car and the potential buyer does not. Market equilibrium is dened as a Nash equilibrium. 1. Suppose p = 0.5. What is the market equilibrium price. What kinds of cars are traded in the equilibrium? (Nash equilibrium) 2. Suppose p = 0.8. What are the possible market equilibria (Nash equilibria)? What kinds of cars are traded in the equilibria? (hint: it is on purpose that the question uses the plural for possible equilibria). Problem 5 Lemon's problem (12 points) Consider the market for used cars. The overall population of used cars is a fraction p plums and a fraction 1 p lemons. Used car sellers value plums at $2,000 and lemons at $1,000. Used car buyers value plums at $2,400 and lemons at $1,200. There is asymmetric information. The seller of a car knows the type of the car and the potential buyer does not. Market equilibrium is dened as a Nash equilibrium. 1. Suppose p = 0.5. What is the market equilibrium price. What kinds of cars are traded in the equilibrium? (Nash equilibrium) 2. Suppose p = 0.8. What are the possible market equilibria (Nash equilibria)? What kinds of cars are traded in the equilibria? (hint: it is on purpose that the question uses the plural for possible equilibria)