PROBLEM 5 Suppose that Rob and Coleen are playing an infinitely repeated version of the following game: Colleen A 3 Rob was Suppose also that Rob and Colleen have a discount factor of :1. Consider the following strategy, called \"Compromise": 1. In the first period, pick 3 2. In every period after the rst one, do the following: a. If my opponent has picked B in each of the previous periods, pick B again b. Otherwise, pick A from now on until the end of times. Part 1 (2 marks}. State the no-defection condition for a player choosing this strategy if the other player is also choosing it. Part 2 (10 marks). Find the values of A for which (Compromise, Compromise) is a Nash Equilibrium Part 3 (3 marks]. State with proper notation the path induced by (Compromise. Compromise) Now consider the following strategy, called "Naive\": Always pick 3. Part4 (5 marks). State with proper notation the path induced by (Naive, Naive) Part 5 (10 marks). Is it possible to find values of A for which (Naive,Naive) is a Nash Equilibrium? Explain your