Question
Q) Two firms produce a homogeneous good. The market demand is given by Q(p) = 20 - p, and the cost function is TC(q) =
Q) Two firms produce a homogeneous good. The market demand is given by Q(p) = 20 - p, and the cost function is TC(q) = q. (Same for both firms.) Suppose the two firms compete in the style of Bertrand by simultaneously choosing their prices. The prices must be whole numbers. What are the Nash equilibria price or prices for both firms ?
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Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture
Authors: James Brickley, Clifford W. Smith Jr., Jerold Zimmerman
6th edition
73523143, 73523149, 978-0073523149
