Q1 Consider the strategicform game depicted below: a b c a 7, 2 2, 7 3, 6 b 2, 7 7,2 4, 5 Let 3010.1) denote the probability with which player 1 (the row player) plays strategy a, and let 331(5)) be the probability with which she plays strategy (I. Let p2 (a) be the probability with which player 2 (the column player) plays strategy a, p2(b) the probability with which he plays strategy I), and pg (0) the probability with which he plays strategy c. a) Show that there is no mixedstrategy Nash equilibrium where 102(9) > 0, 332(3)) > 0, and 332(0) > 0. b) Show that there is no mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium where 332 (a) = 0, 332(3)) > 0, and 332(0) > 0. c) Show that there is no mixedstrategy Nash equilibrium where 332 (a) > 0, 332(3)) > 0, and 132(6) = 0. d) There is a (unique) mixedstrategy Nash equilibrium where 102(0) > 0, p2(b) = 0, and 302(0) > 0. Compute this equilibrium