Q1. Consider the two firms engaging in the Bertrand competition. On the demand side the market demand equation is p=150-Q. Consumers only buy from the firm charging the lower price. When charging the same price, they share the market equally. On the supply side, they have different marginal costs, with MC=50 and MC2=40, and there is no fixed cost. A. Find the Nash equilibrium. B. Find each firm's profit. (You can round the numbers in calculation.) C. Find consumer surplus and social welfare. (You can round the numbers in calculation.) Q1. Consider the two firms engaging in the Bertrand competition. On the demand side the market demand equation is p=150-Q. Consumers only buy from the firm charging the lower price. When charging the same price, they share the market equally. On the supply side, they have different marginal costs, with MC=50 and MC2=40, and there is no fixed cost. A. Find the Nash equilibrium. B. Find each firm's profit. (You can round the numbers in calculation.) C. Find consumer surplus and social welfare. (You can round the numbers in calculation.)