Q2 The Revenue Equivalence Theorem 4 Points Consider a sealed-bid auction in which the bidder with the highest bid wins the item and only the winner pays the average of the two highest bids; i.e., if the two highest bids were 0.9 and 0.8, then the winning bidder would pay 0.85. Buyers who don't win pay nothing. Use the revenue equivalence theorem to derive the symmetric equilibrium bidding function b(u). As usual, assume that there are N bidders with private valuations v drawn independently from the uniform(0, 1) probability distribution. Show your work. Upload an image of your answer as a pdf file. Please select file(s) Select file(s) Q2 The Revenue Equivalence Theorem 4 Points Consider a sealed-bid auction in which the bidder with the highest bid wins the item and only the winner pays the average of the two highest bids; i.e., if the two highest bids were 0.9 and 0.8, then the winning bidder would pay 0.85. Buyers who don't win pay nothing. Use the revenue equivalence theorem to derive the symmetric equilibrium bidding function b(u). As usual, assume that there are N bidders with private valuations v drawn independently from the uniform(0, 1) probability distribution. Show your work. Upload an image of your answer as a pdf file. Please select file(s) Select file(s)