Q3 Sealed-Bid Auctions with Three Bidders There are three risk-neutral bidders with valuations independently drawn from the uniform distribution on [0, 100]. Consider a sealed-bid auction for a single object. Each bidder i simul- taneously and independently submits a bid by for an object. First, consider a standard first-price auction. The bidder with the highest bid gets the object and pays her bid. The losers pay nothing. Assume that all three bidders follow linear bidding strategy of the form bi(vi) = B* vi for all i =1,2,3 and 0 b2, bj > b3) = Pr(bj > by) * Pr(bj > b3) (b) Determine the Bayesian Nash equilibrium bid functions for all bidders. Compare bid func- tions to the ones we derived in class for a standard first-price auction with two bidders (N = 2). Provide Intuition. (c) Calculate expected revenue from this auction (you will need the lecture slide "Order Statis- tics" ). Now, consider a standard second-price auction. The bidder with the highest bid gets the object and pays the second-highest bid. The losers pay nothing