Q3 Strategic Incentives Consider the following preferences: m1: WI >- w2 >- w3 wl: m2 >- m3 >- m1 m2: w2 > w3 >- w1 w2: m3 >- ml >- 1112 m3: w3>-w1>w2 w3: m1>m2>m3 (a) Find a match produced by the manproposing DA. Is it a good match for man? Is it a good match for women? (b) Find a match produced by the womanproposing DA. Is it a good match for man? Is it a good match for women? (c) Suppose that a manproposing DA will be used to produce a match. Suppose that wl strategically submits a rank of ID? >- m3 >- wl (i.e.1 stating that she prefers to stay single rather than being matched to m1)? What will be the nal match assuming that all other participants are truthful? Did it help wl to get a better partner? (d) Suppose that a manproposing DA will be used to produce a match. Suppose that wl strategically submits a rank of m2 >- wl [Lew stating that she prefers to stay single rather than being matched to ml or m3)? What will be the nal match assuming that all other participants are truthful? Did it help wl to get a better partner