Question 1 (1 point) Consider the following game: L R T 1,0 0,1 B 0,1 1,0 Suppose that p is the probability that Row Player Chooses T and q is the probability that column player chooses L (Left). There is a mixed strategy equilibrium where Op = 1/4, q = 1/4 Op = 1/2, q = 1/4 Op = 1/2, q = 1/2 Op = 3/4, q = 1/4 Question 2 (1 point) Please refer to question 1. In an experiment, we would typically observe the following: Row player choosing T a large majority of the time Row player choosing T about 50% of the time O) Row player choosing B a large majority of the time () Row player never choosing BQuestion 3 [1 point} Now consider this game. Which of the following is a mixed strategy equilibrium of the game [p is the probability that the row player chooses T and q is the probability that the column player chooses L} L e T 1,0 o,1 3 0,1 r'n U [:1 = 1:4, :3] = 1;: {j p = 1:2, [:1 = 3M 0 p = 334,111 = 11"2 If} p = 1:2, :3] = 1M x. Question 4 (1 point) Please refer to question #3. If this game were run as an experiment, we would expect to observe the following pattern O Column player would choose L a large majority of the time O Column player would choose L about 50% of the time O Column player would choose L less than one half of the time O Column player would never choose L Question 5 (1 point) Please refer to question #3. In this game, according to the Noisy Best Response Model, in an experiment we would observe O More play of T and L than in the Mixed Strategy Equilibrium More play of T and R than in the Mixed Strategy Equilibrium O More play of B and L than in the Mixed Strategy Equilibrium O More play of B and R than in the Mixed Strategy Equilibrium'Question 6 [1 point} A Chicken lGame has how many Nash eouilibria {including also mixed strategy eouilibria}? Question I" [1 point} An own payoff effect is {3| that a payoff that a player owns is treated as more important than a payoff she does not own. J.- | "-|_ :I that a change in the other player's payoff causes no change in her own choice probabilities {3| that a change in a player's own payoff causes a change in her own choice probabilities {3| that a change in the other player's payoff causes a change in her own choice probabilities Question 8 (1 point) In American football at most times, one team is on offense and the other is on defense. A team on offense can either run or pass on each play. A team on defense can either try to defend against run or against pass plays. Suppose that if a team on offense runs while the defense is trying to defend against the pass, the team on offense gains on average 5 yards, and therefore the defense loses 5 yards (so that the payoff for the offense is +5 and that of the defense is -5). If the team on offense passes while the defense is trying to defend against the run, the team on offense gains on average 10 yards, and therefore the defense loses 10 yards (so that the payoff for the offense is +10 and that of the defense is -10). If the defense defends against the same type of play as the offense runs, there are zero yards gained and both teams receive a payoff of 0. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, how often does the offense choose to run? 1/5 of the time 1/3 of the time 1/2 of the time 2/3 of the time Question 9 (1 point) Please refer to question 8. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, how often does the defense defend against the run 1/3 of the time O 1/2 of the time 2/3 of the time NeverQuestion 10 (1 point) Please refer to question #8. Based on the results from experiments, would we expect the offensive team to O Run more than predicted by the equilibrium? O Run as much as predicted in the equilibrium? O) Run less than predicted in the equilibrium O Never run