Question 1 (1 point)

The marginal per-capita return is

Question 1 options:

	the amount that it costs a player to contribute $1 to a pubic good
	the payoff that each player gets from the total amount contributed to the public good
	the amount a player gets from each dollar she does not contribute to the public good
	the amount that each player benefits from each dollar that any player contributes to the public good

Question 2 (1 point)

Hawkes (1993) found that male large game hunters among the !Kung of southern Africa kept how many of the daily calories they acquired for their household

Question 2 options:

	28000
	5000
	2500
	2000

Question 3 (1 point)

As the marginal per capita return increases.

Question 3 options:

	contrfibutions tend to increase
	contributions tend not to change
	contributions tend to decrease
	contributions oscillate more

Question 4 (1 point)

As a public good game is repeated with the players

Question 4 options:

	contributions tend to increase
	contributions tend to stay the same
	contributions tend to decrease
	contributions tend to increase when MPCR is high and decrease when MPCR is low

Question 5 (1 point)

Consider an experiment with a group of four players, playing a voluntary contributions mechanism game for 10 periods. Each of the players starts off with $15 in each period, and in each period they choose simultaneously how much to contribute to the group account. The MPCR is .5.

What is the maximum total amount of money that all of the member of the group together can earn in one period of this game?

Question 5 options:

	150
	120
	80
	60

Question 6 (1 point)

Please refer to question #5. Suppose that in a given period players 1 and 2 contribute $10 to the group account, and players 3 and 4 contribute 0. How much does each player earn in that period?

Question 6 options:

	Players 1 and 2 earn $30 and Players 3 and 4 earn $40
	Players 1 and 2 earn $25 and Players 3 and 4 earn $35
	Players 1 and 2 earn $20 and Players 3 and 4 earn $30
	Players 1 and 2 earn $15 and Players 3 and 4 earn $25

Question 7 (1 point)

What is a good way of increasing contributions in a Public Good (or Voluntary Conrtibutions game)

Question 7 options:

	Decrease the MPCR
	Allow participants to communicate with each other between periods
	Play more periods
	All of the above

Question 8 (1 point)

Suppose a second stage was added to the game where each player can observe what each other player contributed. Each player can then pay $1 to reduce any other player's payoff by $3, and can make as many times as she would like within a period. What would happen?

Question 8 options:

	Contributions would be higher than they would be without the second stage
	Contributions would be about the same as they would be without the second stage
	Contributions would be lower than they would be without the second stage
	Contrfibutions would instantly drop to zero