Question 1} [3i] points] Ser Eroun has made a reputation for himself as a. gifted sell-sword who sells his services to people awaiting Trial by Combat. The demand for sell-sword services in the kingdom of Vale is p = l Q, where p is the price when {3 is the total number of Trials by ICombat fought by sell-swords. Ser Eronn is the only sell-sword in the kingdom of 'vvale currently providing such services, and is thus producing the monopoly output level. Sandor Clegane, a traveling warrior who recently entered the kingdom, gets enticed by the promise of wealth and becomes a potential entrant in this sellsword business. If both sellswords operate in this market, they would hare to settle for Gourmet doopoly outputs and prots. Ser Bronn would like to deter entry; however, he cannot commit to the monopoly output after (may. Each sellsword has a marginal cost of e: [and sent xed cost], where a: is the last dig-t of your UCD student identity number {make sure you write dorm your student id at the beginning of the question and also make sure that you are using your student identity number: we would deduct points if you don't do one of these tum lings}. For example, if your student id is lfirii'll, then 3: should he 9. If Ser Eronn can pay a fee to the corrupt \"Lord Protector of the 1|stale" [Lord Haelish] for exclusive rights to the market, what is the largest fee he would be willing to pay to prevent entry? (Hint: Start by nding the monopoly and Cournot duopoly prots. He would pay a fee that would make him indifferent between prevuting and accommodating entry.) How much would Ser Bronn and Sandor produce together if they instead could agree on a collusive outcome? [The collusive outcome is where rms together produce the monopoly output and then share the monopoly prots} Show that the total prot under collusion {monopoly prot} is more than what they were collectively making in the Couram. outcome