Question 1 Ali and Beshar are playing the following alternating offers bargaining game: Ali starts with an offer to divide f1 between the two players. Beshar can either reject or accept. If Beshar rejects, Ali can make a second offer that Beshar can again either reject or accept. If Beshar rejects the second offer, he gets to make a counter offer to Ali which Ali can either accept or reject. If Ali rejects Beshar's offer, both end up with LO. Both players discount future payoffs by 6. Part a Draw the extensive form game tree for this alternating offers bargaining game. Part b What is the subgame perfect equilibrium of this finite game? Part c Suppose the players repeat this game infinitely, with Ali making two consecutive offers followed by a single counter offer by Beshar. The game ends as soon as an offer is accepted and the money is split accordingly. What is the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game