Question 1 Bob and Frank met on a dating site and are thinking about going on a date. Bob first decides whether to ask Frank out (A) or not (N). If Bob chooses N, then the date will not happen, and they receive payoffs (3,5). If Bob chooses A, then Frank decides whether to go on the date (g) or not (n). If Frank chooses n, they receive payoffs (5,3). If Frank chooses g, then they go on the date and play the following game in which they choose actions simultaneously Frank t b P F 8, 2 0,0 3, 2 Bob B 0.0 2,8 0.0 (a) (1 point) Draw the extensive form of the game. (b) (2 points) How many subgames does this game have? Define the pure strategies of each player. (c) (5 points) Find all pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria of the game. (d) (2 points) Is there a Nash equilibrium in which both players decide to go on the date (i.e., Bob chooses A and Frank chooses g)? If yes, write down such Nash equilibrium. If not, explain why not