Question 1 Consider a single neighbourhood in which the housing units might be desirable to two types of individuals called Blues [B] and Greens {G}. Suppose that Pg shows the price iat Greens would he willing to pat,r for a house in the neighbourhood. The equation for Pr is given below as a fraction of Greens {is} in this neighbourhood: Pp'x'azos xdi'iosixui'fu Blues constitute the relatively,r richer part of the society. Pb shows the price that Blues are willing to pa},r for a house in this neighbourhood. The equation for Pb is given below also as a function of Greens [9:]: in this neighbourhood: Pbi'x'i :1.2x Pr and Pi; also reect the preferences of Greens and Blues as Greens and Blues are willing to pav higher prices for based on the \"preferable\" fraction of Greens. The fraction of Greens in the \"next period\" is given as :r' below as a function of x to take account of the fact that in an},r period some of the Greens ma],P sell to a Blue while some of the blues may:r sell to a Green xlzx+nx lxingFb'i st and ii are constant positive coefficients. a} 1What is the fraction of Greens (x) that Greens living in this neighbourhood would prefer to see the most in this neighbourhood? What is the fraction of Greens {ij that Blues living in this neighbourhood would prefer to see the most in this neighbourhood? b} By determining the sign of dorms , indicate all equilibriums] of the resulting housing market and indicate which equilibrium{s] are stable in the replicator dynamic in the tent. c] Is it possible to have stable equilibrium, where the neighbourhood is formed bv either all Greens andfor all Blues