Question 1. For the game below, give the strategic form of the game. Compute the pure strategy Nash equilibria and subgame perfect equilibria. (3,0) (8,5) W (4, G) (2, 1) Z (6, 4) (3, 2) Question 2. Consider the following strategic situation. Firm A decides whether to enter firm B's industry or not. Denote these choices e and n respectively. Firm B observes this decision. If firm A enters, then the two firms simultaneously decide whether to advertise. Otherwise, firm B alone decides whether to advertise. With two firms in the market, the firma earn profits of $3 million each if they both advertise and $5 million if they both do not advertise. If only one firm advertises, then it earns $6 million and the other earns $1 million. When firm B is solely in the industry, it earna $4 million if it advertises and $3.5 million if it does not advertise. Firm A earns $0 if it does not enter. 1. Represent the game in extensive form and find all subgame perfect equilibria. 2. Give the strategic form of the game and find all Nash equilibria. Question 3. A manufacturer of automobile tires produces tires at a cost of $10 per tire. It sells units to a retailer who in turn sells the tires to consumers. Suppose that the retailer faces the inverse demand curve p = 200 -. 4 100 That is, if the retailer brings q tires to the market, then these tires will be sold at a price of p = 200 - The. The retailer has no cost of production, other than whatever it must pay to the manufacturer for the tires. 1. Suppose that the manufacturer and retailer interact as follows. First, the manufacturer sets a price I that the retailer must pay for each tire. Then, the retailer decides how many tires q to purchase from