Question 1.

in your opinion what can you respond to this answer U.S Intelligence Operation:

U.S intelligence conducts drone strike to kill Iranian military leader Qasem Soleimani:

9 November 2022

Key Observations

This event highlights the use of U.S intelligence to predict and deter incoming threats. Throughout this operation, the U.S used several different methods of collecting intelligence which ultimately led them to the decision of conducting a precision drone strike to eliminate the Iranian military leader Qasem Soleimani. There are several things we should consider when discussing the success/failure of this operation. These include-

• What methods of collecting intelligence were employed ?
• Does this event highlight limitations or strengths of certain INTs ?
• Was any specific technology critical to the outcome of this event ?
• What does this event suggest about the future of intelligence collection & analysis ?

Introduction & Background

Qasem Soleimani was an Iranian military officer who served in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Soleimani was on the U.S radar for some time due to the fact he was planning attacks on various American diplomats and service members in Iraq and throughout the region. "On January 3, 2020, the U.S. military conducted a drone strike near Baghdad International Airport that killed Qasem Soleimani, the leader within the Iranian military of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)" This event entails the use of U.S military intelligence to conduct a special military operation. This strike was justified as an effort to deter an imminent attack on the United States "General Soleimani was actively developing plans to attack American diplomats and service members in Iraq and throughout the region." The basis for this attack is debated, as the attack promoted a strong reaction in Iraq. On January 5th, 2020, the Iraqi parliament voted to remove U.S troops from Iraq. There were many decisions made in response to the intelligence collected for this operation. And we will overall look at how this intelligence was collected, and whether or not the operation was a success.

Methods of Intel Used

The U.S used several different methods of collecting intelligence for this operation. These methods include SIGINT, HUMINT and IMINT. The primary method to track down and target Qasem Soleimani was through the use of IMINT. Imagery intelligence is derived from various sensors such as radar, infrared, live video feeds, photography and lasers. This type of intelligence is nonliteral which means that specialized professionals are required to interpret and analyze the data into an understandable format. (3). The drone used to destroy the convoy that Solaimani was in used imagery to relay back to the controller and the remote pilot used the remote capability to execute a missile strike on the convoy. (5) Despite the use of IMINT to actually destroy the convoy, a HUMINT component was also used to aid in discovering the location of Soleimani. Initially, cell phones were used to track the location of Soleimani. Compromised cell phones with spyware were sold to Soleimani's handlers via a market where the handlers were reported to shop for his "disposable phones." The CIA planted these compromised phones in the market and the handlers just happened to buy them. Using the numbers for the cell phones the US had access to Solemani's location. This endeavor could not have been accomplished without the use of Israeli intelligence personnel who gave the CIA this piece of information. This form of intelligence is known as literal intelligence because it does not require any special interpretation or analysis. The Israeli's simply gave that intelligence to the US.(4).

Highlighted Strengths and Weaknesses of Methods

There are some very compelling strengths in using imagery intelligence to accomplish a goal. First off, tactical military use of IMINT does not need to be protected as much as the data being used was tactical in nature and needs to be disseminated broadly and quickly. The faster the images being transferred to the operations team needing the latest information the better the chances of mission success.. In this particular case, the location of Soleimani was already known due to the use of cell phone tracking and thus all that was needed for the drone operations to be successful was to confirm the identity of Soleimani using imagery from the drone. Once this was done it was easy to command the drone to fire on Soleimani's convoy.Another strength of IMINT is that depending on the sensor being used, one can gather intelligence from space using satellite imagery. The imagery can then be manipulated to develop a 3-D effect (stereograph techniques). This is very useful when ground enemy units are trying to camouflage their equipment from the military. Again, with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles or drones, the imagery being captured will be more detailed as the UAVs fly a lot closer to the ground than Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites and are capable of capturing license plate numbers. Images are relayed and distributed in real time and can also provide status of ground troop movement to multiple operations centers.

On the other hand, there are several weaknesses associated with the use of IMINT. One such weakness is that some imagery captured through clandestine means is meant to stay clandestine until it reaches the appropriate customer for analysis. So the benefit of this type of IMINT is not immediate. Also for this particular operation other types of intelligence were needed in order to finally target Soleimani.(2).

Technology Critical to the Outcome of Operation

For IMINT to be viable, the use of technology is at the forefront of this type of intelligence. The collectors used for IMINT are UAVs, aerostats and satellites. The constant advancement of optical sensors give way to better images and the electronic equipment that stores and transmit these images must also keep pace with this technology. The simplest explanation is the use of a digital camera. The advancement of the optical sensor provides an image that requires more storage space and processing speed to be able to create the image being seen on the picture. The bad part about satellite use is that the capabilities are sometimes outdated by the time the satellite is launched into orbit. With the use of UAVs for the Soleimani operation, if additional sensors were needed to track him down the UAV would simply return to base for an upgrade or change so that it can resume its mission. In space, this capability is impossible unless there is a space mission where astronauts are trained to change out parts in space like the way the Hubble Space Telescope was upgraded. This is a rare occurrence and very costly. (2)

Overall success of operation

Nonliteral intelligence is one of the greatest strengths that we have as a nation. Our ability to have various platforms available for use provides an asymmetric capability that we can leverage to our advantage. The execution of Soleimani by using IMINT and HUMINT

Intelligence sources show how the combination of both types of intelligence sources can provide the necessary knowledge needed to execute the mission successfully. (2). Without the use of human intelligence, the possibility of tracking Soleimani would have been delayed. Once his location was determined our technological advances for sensors came into play and allowed us the full capability of the UAV platform to target and terminate Soleimani remotely. IMINT must continue to be utilized and advanced as much as possible in order to secure our national assets and ensure that our national interest can endure.

What does this event suggest about the future of intelligence collection & analysis

The success of this operation overall highlights the increasingly important role of technology in the collection of intelligence. This operation was made possible by the use of IMINT and modern technology and has also shown us that nonliteral intelligence is one of the greatest strengths our nation holds. From taking a look at the technology that made this operation possible, it's clear to us that the future of intelligence collection & analysis is progressing constantly as we improve our technological capabilities. The success of this event overall proves the increasingly important role of technology in the use of collecting intelligence.

Question 2.

2. in your opinion what would be your response to this answer Introduction Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, which claimed nearly 3,000 lives, it was integral for the U.S. government to locate and reprimand the architect behind the attacks committed against the U.S. (Commemoration, 2021). When it was discovered at 9:30 pm on September 11, 2001, that Islamic Terrorist- Osama Bin Laden- was responsible for the attacks, the manhunt for Osama Bin Laden officially began (Jacobsen, 2019). Designed to hold Bin Laden accountable and to ensure terrorist attacks like 9/11 would never be replicated, the U.S. intelligence community would spend nearly a decade in the search for the terrorist leader. Background To pinpoint the whereabouts of Bin Laden, the U.S. intelligence community, specifically the CIA, played a critical role via their intelligence collection process. By utilizing non-literal and literal intelligence collection strategies, specifically Human intelligence, Communications intelligence, and Geospatial intelligence (Optical imaging/Signals intelligence), the CIA was able to locate Bin Laden. Definitions for INT's Literal intelligence- type of intelligence easily understood by consumers (Clark, 1) Non-literal intelligence- type of intelligence not easily understood by consumers (Clark, 1) Human intelligence (HUMINT)- intelligence that is collected by human sources (Clark, 45) Communications intelligence (COMINT)- intelligence collected via the interception, processing, and reporting of an opponent's communications Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT)- the collection of optical imagery from satellites (Clark, 239) 3 Al Qaeda= AQ Analysis The discovery of Bin Laden's whereabouts was the culmination of multiple collection breaks aided by the substantiation of several INT's. When analyzed jointly, the CIA located Bin Laden in a neighborhood in Abbottabad, Pakistan- concluding the nearly decade-long search for the terrorist leader (Death of Osama, n.d.). The first major break in the case of Osama Bin Laden was the discovery of his courier via HUMINT and COMINT conducted at Guantanamo Bay. At Guantanamo Bay were several high-profile AQ officials, those of whom were interrogated about the whereabouts of Bin Laden. Since the CIA knew that AQ did not use phones or have face-to-face meetings, they speculated that "if they could infiltrate the couriers' system, one of the couriers might lead them to Bin Laden" (Somaidai, 2011). The Courier System Following 9/11, "Bin Laden strictly avoided phone or e-mail communications for fear that they would be intercepted. Instead, he relied exclusively on couriers." (Finn, 2011). Among the most critical interviews conducted at Guantanamo Bay was of senior AQ operative Abu Faraj al-Libbi. Libbi, who was arrested in 2005, provided invaluable information about "individuals who might have been providing support to Bin Laden" (Finn, 2011). Having spent two years as Bin Laden's official courier, Libbi was highly knowledgeable of the inner workings of Al Qaeda. During interrogation, he alerted U.S. officials to AQ courier Al Kuwaiti- 4 exclaiming that "Al Kuwaiti was a protege of Khalid Sheik Mohammed- the self-avowed architect of the September 11 attacks" (Finn, 2011). In conjunction with Libbi's remarks, "Al Kuwaiti's name was mentioned by five other captured AQ members at Guantanamo Bay" (Somaidai, 2011). Among the five other captured AQ members mentioning Al Kuwaiti was "Khalid Sheikh Mohamed who was a top leader in AQ after Bin Laden'' (Somaidai, 2011). The other four were AQ fighters. Interestingly enough, Mohamed "confessed that Al Kuwaiti was not an important person inside Al Qaeda," and the other four fighters confessed that "Al Kuwaiti had large responsibilities" (Somaidai, 2011). Understanding that it would be beneficial for Mohammed to deflate the value of Al Kuwaiti's role to protect Bin Laden, U.S. intelligence presumed that Al Kuwaiti had connections to Bin Laden. In August 2010, the NSA intercepted a call from an AQ sympathizer in Pakistan in which the sympathizer mentioned that he was "back working with the people that he had been working with before" (Somaidai, 2011). Immediately after, the NSA tracked the "call and found that the number generating the call belonged to Al Kuwaiti" (Somaidai, 2011). Intelligence further learned that Al Kuwaiti was living in a large compound in "Abbottabad, 40 miles north of Islamabad and only 300 hundred meters away from The Pakistan Military Academy in Waziristan province" (Somaidai, 2011). As soon as Al Kuwaiti's whereabouts were discovered, U.S. intelligence implemented a mass surveillance operation around the compound. To study the compound, the U.S. utilized SIGINT, specifically drones (In bin, 2011). 5 From their surveillance, U.S. intelligence learned that the compound had all the characteristics necessary to house Bin Laden. In fact, "there was no security technology at the compound and no internet or TV antenna" (Deman & Windrem, 2011). Surveillance found that "there were no social relationships with the neighbors, and that the children inside the compound did not attend school or play with the neighbor's children" (Somaidai, 2011). The people living in the compound also burned their trash, an action idiosyncratic amongst the neighborhood (Deman & Windrem, 2011). Finally, optical imaging found that one person in the compound would walk inside every day and never leave for any reason (Somaidai, 2011). They expected this individual to be Bin Laden. After analyzing the aforementioned information, President Obama authorized the deployment of force to raid the compound and find Bin Laden. He was executed on May 2, 2011 (Dahl, 2014). Outlook In sum, the IC was able to locate Bin Laden due to multiple INT's, among those being: HUMINT, COMINT, SIGINT and GEOINT. While Bin Laden was successful in evading capture for nearly a decade, the IC remained committed to finding his whereabouts, even when red herrings led officials astray. The IC's steps to find Bin Laden provide the impetus for the challenges of modern intelligence work, specifically, how modern technology serves as both an asset and a detriment. The raid itself highlights the ethical constraints inherent to intelligence work. Most importantly, the hunt for Bin Laden showcased that traditional techniques still work- particularly- HUMINT. The crucial information obtained concerning Bin Laden's courier 6 was learned through interrogation. Instead of relying purely on today's modern "tools" like Satellite imagery, the IC still interviewed close connections. This technique was vital- especially, when considering Bin Laden's propensity to live off the grid. Yes, surveillance technology added certainty that Bin Laden lived at the Abbottabad compound; however, HUMINT brought the IC to the compound. The search for Bin Laden suggests that despite the proliferation of the Internet, the IC must not become too reliant on it to locate criminals. The Bin Laden manhunt showcases how fugitives can survive without the Internet in the modern era. The IC must, like they did in the Bin Laden search, seek to understand other means by which fugitives are receiving information. Dependence on high-tech communications and surveillance measures with the neglection of HUMINT will only yield dire results. One of the more pervasive ethical issues that was no stranger in the Bin Laden raid was the lack of 100% certainty that Bin Laden lived in the compound. Since the IC could not conclude with absolute certainty that Bin Laden was in the compound, there was the possibility that the U.S. would send troops on a false mission against ordinary citizens (Bill, 2011). Although Bin Laden was present in the compound, the IC must utilize as many INTs as possible to prove that their target is present. In totality, the hunt for Bin Laden provides a marquee study on modern intelligence work. Even against adverse odds, the U.S. was able to locate and execute Bin Laden by implementing traditional and advanced collection techniques.