Question 1. Suppose you are responsible for setting ticket prices at a museum. Following market research, you've discovered that there are two distinct customer groups, each making up half of the total visitors: locals and tourists. The table below displays the maximum amount each customer type is willing to pay for single-visit tickets and for yearly passes:

	Single Visit	Yearly pass
Local	15	20
Tourist	12	13

Suppose there is plenty of space in the museum, so the marginal cost of giving access to the museum is zero.

a) If the museum can engage in first degree price discrimination, how much would it charge from each type of customer?

b) In practice, how might the museum engage in first degree price discrimination? Can you think of a reason this strategy may fail?

Now, for the remainder of this question, suppose that the museum cannot tell who is a local and who is a tourist.

c) Suppose the museum decides to sell season passes only. How much money can it make?

d) Show that the museum can make more money than in (c) but less money than (a) by engaging in second-degree price discrimination.