Question 1

The claim that "The Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998 gives judges too much power to undermine Parliament" is a complicated one that necessitates a study of the division of powers and parliamentary sovereignty. According to Section 3 of the HRA, primary and secondary legislation must be construed in a way that, to the greatest degree feasible, respects convention rights. Case law can be used to explore the several ways in which the courts have interpreted this regulation.

One objection is that judges are given undue discretion under Section 3 of the HRA, which permits them to interpret the law and essentially modify its meaning. Though the Rent Act of 1977 did not specifically mention same-sex partners, the House of Lords understood the term "spouse" to include them in Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza (2004) UKHL 30. Some who contend that courts shouldn't have the authority to interpret legislation; rather, this is a job best left to Parliament, attacked this ruling.

In a similar vein, the Court of Appeal permitted the HRA to supersede laws pertaining to the downgrading of secure tenancies in Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v. Donoghue [2002] QB 48. Some see this as an instance of judges overstepping their authority and subverting the will of Parliament.

It is crucial to remember that the HRA's Section 3 also states, "so far as it is possible to do so." This implies that courts must, to the greatest degree feasible, interpret the law in a way that is consistent with convention rights rather than having unrestricted authority to do so. The House of Lords concluded in R v. A (No 2) [2001] UKHL 25 that it was not conceivable to construe the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 2000 in a way that would protect an individual who had consenting homosexual intercourse with a child, demonstrating this constraint on judicial jurisdiction. This demonstrates how the wording and purpose of the statute itself place restrictions on judges.

In addition, Section 4 of the HRA gives judges the authority to find legislation incompatible with rights guaranteed by the convention. This proclamation does not, however, invalidate the law. The House of Lords ruled in A v. United Kingdom (the Belmarsh case) [2004] UKHL 56 that the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001's prolonged imprisonment of foreign terrorist suspects violated their right to liberty under the European Convention on Human Rights. Still, Parliament had the last say on how to resolve this conflict. This demonstrates that judges can spot inconsistencies between laws and convention rights but are not able to overturn choices made by Parliament directly.

Ultimately, it might be said that although courts are granted certain authority under the HRA to interpret and determine whether laws are consistent with convention rights, this authority is not unrestricted. Judges must interpret the law in a way that is, to the greatest degree feasible, consistent with convention rights, but also adhering to the text and meaning of the legislation. The provisions in the HRA maintain a balance between the judiciary and Parliament, providing for the protection of human rights while yet preserving legislative autonomy.

In conclusion, it is not totally true to say that the HRA grants judges excessive authority to subvert Parliament. Judges are given certain authority under the HRA to interpret laws in a way that respects convention rights, although this authority is restricted and has limitations. The Human Rights Act's provisions maintain the primacy of Parliament while guaranteeing the preservation of human rights through a balance between the court and Parliament.

Question two

In some situations, a court's review of the substantial merits of a public body's decision is appropriate. One way to make sure public entities follow the law and utilize their authority appropriately is through judicial review, or JR. Although illegality and procedural impropriety are frequently the bases for justification of judgments of relative novelty (JR), substantive irrationality and proportionality can also serve as legitimate reasons for judicial intervention.

Upholding the rule of law is one of JR's primary goals. For this to happen, rational decision-making by public entities grounded in pertinent factors is necessary. The Wednesbury test, which measures irrationality, was developed by the court in the Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223. If no reasonable public body could have reached a certain judgment, then that choice would be deemed illogical according to this standard. This gives courts the authority to step in when a choice crosses the line into unacceptable decision-making because it is so irrational.

Additionally, the idea of proportionality has acquired relevance in international human rights law and can also be a foundation for examining the actual merits of a public body's decision. In order to be proportionate, a decision must be necessary, reasonable, and strike a fair balance between the rights of the person and the public interest. It gives the courts the ability to determine whether a decision made by a public entity violates people's rights in a way that is out of proportion to the intended lawful goal. This is demonstrated by the House of Lords' application of proportionality in R (Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26, whereby the legality of the indefinite imprisonment of non-UK foreign citizens was evaluated.

When it comes to decisions pertaining to basic rights, such as civil freedoms, human rights, or constitutional affairs, courts ought to have the authority to examine the decision-making process of public bodies. In these situations, it's important to make sure that the choice was made fairly and that it was appropriate in the first place. For example, the Supreme Court examined the substantial merits of a judgment pertaining to the right to die in R (Nicklinson) v. Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38. The court conducted a proportionality analysis to ascertain whether the complete prohibition on assisted suicide was warranted or if it unduly interfered with the person's right to autonomy.

It is crucial to remember that the court should proceed cautiously while examining the decision-making process of a public entity. Important factors also include the democratic legitimacy of public entities and the judiciary's respect to expert decision-making. Only where there are obvious grounds for interventionsuch as irrationality or disproportionalityand when the judgment significantly affects rights or interests should the court step in.

In conclusion, there are situations in which it is acceptable for a court to examine the substantive merits of a judgment made by a public entity. Court intervention is legitimately justified on the basis of irrationality and proportionality in order to guarantee that public authorities make logical choices and uphold basic rights. But this review authority need to be used carefully, keeping in mind democratic legitimacy and judicial respect. The ultimate goal of this kind of assessment is to preserve individual rights and the rule of law.

can you elaborate on both these questions please no AI add some more words