Question 1 The market for aircraft is operated as a duopoly by Boeing (rm 1) and Airbus (rm 2). The inverse demand in the market is given by P = 12 Q, where Q is the aggregate quantity. Both rms have a total cost function given by C (qt) = 491;, i 6 {1,2}. (a) Find the Nash equilibrium ((313933) when rms do not collude, and compute the price and prots of each rm in this equilibrium. (b) Suppose that Boeing and Airbus collude to act as a monopolist that split prots evenly. Compute the new equilibrium quantity, price and prots. (c) Now, suppose the total cost functions are C (ql) = 4q1 and C ((32) = 8q2. Find the new Nash equilibrium and compute the price and prots of each rm in this new equilibrium