Question 11 (1 point) What is the Nash equilibrium of the game in pure strategies?Question 11 options:Behave-RewardBehave-PunishMisbehave-PunishThere is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.Question 12 (1 point) Assume Bad Boy knows that Good Girl rewards 80% of the time. Then, if Bad Boy misbehaves 100% of the time, Bad Boy's expected payoff is equal to Question 12 options:2468Question 13 (1 point) Assume Bad Boy knows that Good Girl rewards 80% of the time. Then, if Bad Boy misbehaves 100% of the time, Good Girl's expected payoff is equal to Question 13 options:-7-8-9-10Question 14 (1 point) Assume Bad Boy knows that Good Girl rewards 80% of the time. Then, if Bad Boy misbehaves 100% of the time, which statement is true? Question 14 options:Bad Boy exploits Good Girl for being so predictably niceGood Girl will feel exploited and consider a different mixed strategyBoth a. and b. are correctThis is the best that Good Girl can do.Question 15 (1 point) Assume Good Girl wants to consider a mixed strategy such that she randomly chooses "Reward" and "Punishment" such that Bad Boy is indifferent between "Behave" and "Misbehave". With what probability should Good Girl choose play "Reward."Question 15 options:1/21/31/41/5Question 16 (1 point) Assume Good Girl knows that Bad Boy misbehaves 90% of the time. Then, if Good Girl punishes 100% of the time, Good Girl's expected payoff is equal to Question 16 options:-2-3-4-5Question 17 (1 point) Assume Good Girl knows that Bad Boy misbehaves 90% of the time. Then, if Good Girl punishes 100% of the time, Bad Boy's expected payoff is equal to Question 17 options:-9.5-8.5-7.5-7Question 18 (1 point) Assume Good Girl knows that Bad Boy misbehaves 90% of the time. Then, if Good Girl punishes 100% of the time, then which statement is true?Question 18 options:Good Girl takes advantage of Bad Boy being so predictably misbehaved Bad Boy will feel taken advantage of and consider a different mixed strategyBoth a. and b. are correctThis is the best that Bad Boy can do.Question 19 (1 point) Assume Bad Boy wants to consider a mixed strategy such that he randomly chooses "Behave" and "Misbehave" such that Good Girl is indifferent between "Reward" and "Punish." With what probability should Bad Boy play "Behave."Question 19 options:3/51/21/31/4Question 20 (1 point) A game in which players choose their strategies randomly are called Question 20 options:random gameschance gamesno-clue gamesmixed-strategy gamesQuestion 21 (1 point) In the mixed strategies Nash equilibrium, Bad Boy's expected payoff is _____?Question 21 options:-5-2.50+2.5Question 22 (1 point) In the mixed strategies Nash equilibrium, Good Girl's s expected payoff is _____?Question 22 options:-5-2.50+2.5

Mixed Strategies Consider the following game between two players Bad-Boy and Good-Girl. Bad-Boy can either behave or misbehave whereas Good-Girl can either punish or reward. Below payoff matrix shows the game as pure strategies. Good Girl Reward Punish Behave 5, 5 -5.-5 Bad Boy Misbehave 10,-10 -10,-5