question 2.1 -2.3 for homework

Consider the following game represented in extensive form. 2.1 2.2 2.3 A Pla r1 3 C Playerz 2 --------"--' a P'3W2 X Y X Y (10.10) (2. 2) l0, 0) (14-14) Using the template below, represent this game in strategic form. [3 marks] Assume Player 1 plays A with probability p1 and plays B with probability 3);. Assume Player 2 plays X with probability q. Graph Player 1's expected payoffs from her pure strategies as a function of player 2's q-mix. On the same graph, clearly indicate and label the point(s) at which Player 1 is indifferent between her payoffs. State Player 1's Best Response Rule. [13 marks] This game has a set of mixed strategy Nash Equilibria Where Player 1 plays the pure strategy A and Player 2 mixes between X and Y. For What values of q do these Nash Equilibria exist? Show that Player 2 will indeed be willing to mix given Player 1's strategy. [4 marks]