Question 3. Firm A and Firm B engage in Cournot competition. The inverse demand curve of the market is given by 13(Q) = 75 0-5Q where Q = (1/1 + (13. Firm A and Firm B face the following cost functions, respectively: CAM/i) = 13% 63(93) = 59's (3) What is each rm's prot maximizing quantity Choice (q; and (13)? What is the resulting (b) market price and each rm's prots? NOW, the rms can consider merging. If they merge the new, single, merged rm's cost function is CM ((1114) = 2qM, Where (1M refers to the merged rm's quantity. The inverse market demand curve remains the same. If the rms merge, they share the merged prots evenly. What is the prot maximizing quantity for the merged rm? What is the resulting market price and merged rm's prots? Considering both Firm A and Firm B, do these rms want to merge? Please justify your answer. What is the Consumer Surplus without the merger? What is the Consumer Surplus with the merger? If a regulator is only interested in maximizing Consumer Surplus, should they mandate or prohibit this merger