Question 3 In the basic prisoners' dilemma {PD) game, each player moves only once and the players select their moves simultaneously. The game also has a particular payoff structure of the type shown. for example. in Table 13.1. It is possible to consider extensions to the basic PD game. For example, we can consider a repeated PD. in which each player moves multiple times. We can also consider a sequential version of the game, in which one player moves rst. A sequential PD game could be a "one-shot\" game (played just once) or could be repeated. C) In an innitely repeated PD game, the unique Nash equilbrium is for each player to use a tit-for tat strategy. 0 If the basic PD game is repeated a xed number of times, cooperation is possible in a Nash equilibrium because this gives both players higher payoffs. Q in a one-shot seqential PD game, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome does not change irrespective of who moves rst. C:- In a nitely repeated sequential PD game, there is a rst mover advantage