Question 4. There are two types of worker, high productivity and low productivity. A worker knows what their type is. There is one potential employer who only knows that a given worker is of high type with probability p and low type with probability 1 p. The employer is considering signing a one-time contract with the worker. From the employer's perspective, signing a high type worker is worth $32,000 and signing a low type worker is worth $12,000. A high type worker's opportunity cost of entering into such a contract is $25,000 (that's what they would earn if they don't sign a contract employer}. Similarly, a low type worker's opportunity cost is $8,000. Assume that the employer is acting in a competitive market {iust like in the problem sets where there were two competing employers). Given this assumption, you can conclude that the equi- librium wage offer is the expected productivitylworth of the worker according to the employer's beliefs. Note: a worker can always opt out of signing a contract at the oered wage and save them- selves the opportunity cost (the payoti from not signing is zero). 1. For what values oi p is there an equilibrium where a worker ends up being signed by the employer regardless oi their type