Question (5 points) See page 686 In a small town, all 100 residents live on the west side of town, and they work on the east side of town. People may choose to drive to work, which costs $2 worth of fuel per round trip. There is no overnight parking at work, so anybody driving will drive a round trip. The supply of fuel is perfectly elastic at $2 per the amount required for a round trip. The only downside to driving is that every round trip generates pollution worth $0.03. That pollution affects each and every resident of the small town (for simplicity assume that it even impacts the driver). The other transportation alternative is a free electric tram. It is a good thing the tram is free because people are not willing to pay to take the tram. Half of the town's residents are willing to pay $6 per day to drive, while the other half are willing to pay $4 per day to drive. 1st attempt See Hint Suppose the government wants to achieve a socially optimal level of driving (and car pollution), and to accomplish this goal it decides to impose effluent fees, which it then redistributes evenly to all residents. The optimal amount to charge as a fee is $ per drive. With the effluent fees in place, the net consumer surplus (surplus net of the externality and of any externality-related fee redistribution) is $ . Compared to the competitive equilibrium outcome (no effluent fees of any kind), the net surplus is $ higher. Question (5 points) See page 686 In a small town, all 100 residents live on the west side of town, and they work on the east side of town. People may choose to drive to work, which costs $2 worth of fuel per round trip. There is no overnight parking at work, so anybody driving will drive a round trip. The supply of fuel is perfectly elastic at $2 per the amount required for a round trip. The only downside to driving is that every round trip generates pollution worth $0.03. That pollution affects each and every resident of the small town (for simplicity assume that it even impacts the driver). The other transportation alternative is a free electric tram. It is a good thing the tram is free because people are not willing to pay to take the tram. Half of the town's residents are willing to pay $6 per day to drive, while the other half are willing to pay $4 per day to drive. 1st attempt See Hint Suppose the government wants to achieve a socially optimal level of driving (and car pollution), and to accomplish this goal it decides to impose effluent fees, which it then redistributes evenly to all residents. The optimal amount to charge as a fee is $ per drive. With the effluent fees in place, the net consumer surplus (surplus net of the externality and of any externality-related fee redistribution) is $ . Compared to the competitive equilibrium outcome (no effluent fees of any kind), the net surplus is $ higher
