QUESTION 6 Zack sells cars. The number of cars he is able to sell depends on his own effort "e". Zack's production function is Q = 36. Zack's employer promises to pay him a bonus b for each car sold. However, there is a risk that the company will go bankrupt and will not be able to pay its employees. That is, with probability 0.6 the company will survive and will pay the promised bonus; and with probability 0.4 the company will go bankrupt and will pay nothing. Zack is risk-neutral, and when he chooses his effort he does not know if the company will go bankrupt or not; he only knows the probabilities. For Zack, his effort cost is 3e2. Zack's expected utility equals his expected income minus the cost of effort. Find the optimal effort e* that maximizes Zack's expected utility. {> His optimal effort is e*= 0.3b