Question 9 1 pts Baby Bunting chooses to whether Open (0) a new store or Not (N) in Alexandria where one of its rival-Baby Kingdom's stores is located. If Baby Bunting opts for N, the payoff to Baby Bunting is 10 and Baby Kingdom gets 20. If Baby Bunting chooses to Open, Baby Kingdom then can choose to Fight (F) or Accommodate (A). If Baby Kingdom chooses F, following Baby Bunting's choice to Open, the payoff is (5, 5) to Baby Bunting and Baby Kingdom, respectively. If Baby Bunting chooses to Open, then Baby Kingdom opts forA payoffs are (15, 15). What is the highest payoff enjoyed by Baby Bunting in a Nash equilibria? 05 010 015 020 Q There is not enough information to decide Question 10 1 pts Baby Bunting chooses to whether Open (0) a new store or Not (N) in Alexandria where one of its rival-Baby Kingdom's stores is located. If Baby Bunting opts for N, the payoff to Baby Bunting is 10 and Baby Kingdom gets 20. If Baby Bunting chooses to Open, Baby Kingdom then can choose to Fight (F) or Accommodate (A). If Baby Kingdom chooses F, following Baby Bunting's choice to Open, the payoff is (5, 5) to Baby Bunting and Baby Kingdom, respectively. If Baby Bunting chooses to Open, then Baby Kingdom opts forA payoffs are (15, 15). What is the highest payoff enjoyed by Baby Bunting in the credible (subgame perfect) Nash equilibria? 05 010 015 020 Q There is not enough information to decide Question 11 1 pts Consider two firms in the hardware store market in Sydney, Handy Hardware (HH) and Tradie Heaven (TH). The timing of the game is that first HH chooses to Discount (D) or Not Discount (ND). Having observed its rival's choice, TH can then choose to either D or ND. The payoffs are as follows. If both firms chose D, each firm gets a profit of 2. If both firms opted for ND, each firm also gets 2. If HH chose D and TH opted for ND, HH gets 1 and TH 3. Conversely, if HH chose N and TH went for D, the payoffs are 1 to HH and 3 to TH. If given a choice, you would prefer to be because there is a O Tradie Heaven; second-mover advantage. O Handy Hardware; first-mover advantage. O Tradie Heaven; first-mover advantage. O Handy Hardware; second-mover advantage. either Traide Heaven or Handy Hardware; either second-mover or first-mover advantage.uuesnon 11! 1 pts A celebrity must choose between staying home (H) where the papparazzi can't take photos of her and going to the park [P] where they can. After she makes her decision, the paparazzi chooses between not working (NW) and working (W). If the celebrity stays at home and the paparazzi don't work the payoff is (10,10) for the celebrity and paparazzi respectively. If the celebrity stays home and the paparazzi works, the payoff is {10,5}. If the celebrity goes to the park and the paparazzi works. the payoff is (5.20). If the celebrity goes to the park and the paparazzi does not work, the payoffs are (20,10). What is the subgame perfect equillibrium in this scenario? 0 (H.NW) 0 {HM} O raw: 0 PM) Question 13 1 pts Which of the following statements is/a re true? i. In every game, every subgame-perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium. ii. In sequential-move games, all Nash equilibria are subgame-perfect equilibria. O i only 0 ii only C) neither i nor ii 0 both i and