Question in computer science sir solve this problem and provide me correct solution I$\text{'}$m in very hurry...

Question $1$ Consider the following production function:where L and K are the amount of labour and capital used in the production process, andy is the output. Throughout this question, the output price p is $3$ and the rental rate ofcapital r is $1.$We will first consider a firm in the short run, where the amount of capital is fixed atK$=64.$ The fixed cost is therefore $64.($a$)($Level A$)$ Is there diminishing returns to labour? Explain.$($b$)($Level A$)$ Suppose the wage rate w is $1.$ Find the profit$-$maximising choice of L$.$Calculate the profit$-$maximising output level and the maximised profit. $($There isno need to check the second order condition but of course you can check if youwant to$.)($c$)($Level A$)$ Now suppose w inereases to $2.$ Find the profit$-$maximising choice of L$.$Caleulate the profit$-$maximising output level and the maximised profit. $($Thereis no need to check the second order condition.$)$ You can leave your answers insquare roots.$($d$)($Level A$)$ What is the change in L when u increases from $1$ to $2$ in the short run?You can leave your answers in square roots.Question $2(36$ marks$)$A mass of cotsumers is uniformly distributed along the interval $|0,1].$ Two firms, A and B$,$ arelocated at points $0$ and $1$ respectively We deiote by p$.$ the price of firm $$e A$,$ B$.$ A consunerlocated at point z E $0,1]$ obtains utility Ua$()$ u$-$pA$-$ t if he consumes from firn A$,$ andUa$)$u$-$ PHt$($ he consurnes trom irm B$.$ In the tollowing, we assune that te gosutility in equilibrium. Both firms have a cost function egual to T:$($g$)=(1+$X$),,$ where you shouldsubstitute X for the last number of your student ID number.$($a$)$ Find the demand function for both firms.yF$($L$,$ K$)=4$LtKI$($b$)$ Assune firns set their prices simultaneously. Solve for the Nash equilibrium prices, andcompute the equilibrium profits$6$ marksand profitsteeitberg timing, where firm is the lender. Explain briefly why we shouldNash equilibrium concept to solve this game, and solve for the cqinbm p$($d$)$ Conpare the results obtained in parts $($b$)$ and $($c$)$ and explain the intuition for such difference.Are the equilibria efficient?$5$ marks$)()$ Suppose that there was a technology that allowed firm A to credibly commit not to changeits price $($this option to commit would make firm A the Stackelberg leader, as in part c$).$ Ifonly firm A had access to this technology, how much would firm A be willing to pay for it$?$How would your answer change if the technology wias auctioned to the best bidder $($betweenfirms A and B$)?4$ markslAssume that firms A and B can perfectly discriminate between locations. That is$,$ irm i chooses aprice p$.()$ for each location r E $(0,1]$ Firms now compete by simultaneously choosing the pricingfunctions p$)$ and p$).$ There is no possihbility of arbitrage, and if a consumer may be indifferentbetween firms A and B$,$ they go to the closest firm.$()$ Find the Nash$-$equilibrium pricing functions. That is$,$ you need to find the equilibrium pricesof every firm in every location$\mathrm{.}8$ marks$)$StackelbePlease Please Please Let an Experts Man, Doctor in Compiler Design To solve thisQuestionDon't use Al I WANT ONLY EXPERT PERSONS TO SOLVEITQuestion In Theory of Compilersta abQ$1$ generate target code for the following source language statements :x$=$a$+$b$+$c $*($d$-$e$)$Solve it like this ExampleThree Address Code:d vutarget code for the assignment statement d: $($a$-$b$)+($a$-$c$)+($a$-$c$)$ can be translated into the follsequence of three address code:Statementta$-$bVtud:v$+$uCode GeneratedMOVSUB b$,$ ROaMOV a$,$SUB C$,$ R$1$ADD R$1,$ ROR$1$ADDMOV RO$,$ dRegisterdescriptoRegister emptyRO RO Contains tR$1$ RO containsRI contains uRO comtainsR$1$ contains u$5$ markslRO RO Contains dVAddress descriptort in ROttu in R$1$Vin Riininind in ROmemoryROR$1$ROand