Question S 1 pts Consider a 2-player game, played non-cooperatively as a repeated simultaneously played game with full and symmetric information. Each player can choose to cooperate or compete. If both players to cooperate, each gets a payoff of 5; if both compete, each gets a payoff of 1. In case one chooses to cooperate and one chooses to compete, the former receives a payoff of 0, and the latter of 7. Suppose discount factor between 0 and 1 is chosen to best sustain the (cooperate, cooperate) equilibrium. Then, a (cooperate. cooperate) equilibrium can be sustained in both finite and infinitely repeated game. O a (cooperate, cooperate) equilibrium can be sustained in a finite but not in infinitely repeated game. @ a (cooperate, cooperate) equilibrium can be sustained in an infinitely repeated but not in finite game. @ a (cooperate cooperate) equilibrium cannot be sustained in either ninite or infinitely repeated game