Question Two

Read the fact pattern below and answer the following questions in paragraph format.

Fahad had a student loan that was in arrears. Collection of the loan had been transferred from the original lender to Kneecap Collections Inc., a collection agency. When Kneecap demanded payment, Fahad questioned the amount that was being claimed, which was much larger than the amount of the original loan. Kneecap did not give any explanation and insisted on immediate payment. Fahad said that he would not pay any amount until Kneecap provided an explanation for the amount owing.

Shortly after this, Kneecap began to harass Fahad. They made violent threats to Fahad and repeatedly called his employer, making false statements about Fahad. They told his employer that Fahad had defrauded the employer and that he was secretly working part-time for a competitor. As a result, even though Fahad said that Kneecap was not being truthful, he was fired by his employer.

What claims might Fahad have against Kneecap? Are there any defences available to Kneecap? You are the judge. Read the case "Tran v. Financial Debt Recovery Ltd."

After reading "Tran" and other materials, make a decision and explain how you reached your decision. Do not address damages in detail.

Cases:

Tran v. Financial Debt Recovery Ltd., 2000

Ontario Supreme Court Tran v. Financial Debt Recovery Ltd.1 Date: 2000-11-10 Tran and Financial Debt Recovery Ltd. Court File No. 00-CU-188867SR Ontario Superior Court of Justice Molloy J. Heard: October 23, 2000 Judgment rendered: November 10, 2000 Mark Tran, plaintiff, appearing on his own behalf. A. Savage, for defendant. [1] MOLLOY J.:The plaintiff, Mark Tran, commenced this action under the Simplified Rules on April 17, 2000, in a desperate attempt to end the harassment to which he had been subjected by the defendant debt collection agency. The defendant's activities were directed towards collecting the balance allegedly owing on a student loan. Mr. Tran conducted the action on his own without the benefit of any legal advice. A. BACKGROUND [2] Mr. Tran graduated from the University of Toronto with a commerce degree in 1996. He obtained a job on contract after graduation and began making payments to the bank on his student loan. When the contract ended he was unemployed for eight months, during which time there was a suspension of the requirement of monthly payments on the student loan. In September 1997, Mr. Tran obtained a fulltime job as a financial analyst with an investment consulting company, James P. Marshall Inc. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Tran contacted his bank to resume payments on the student loan but was told the loan was no longer with the bank and he would have to deal directly with the government. Mr. Tran attempted without success to get information from the government about the balance outstanding on his loan and to arrange for repayment. He sent a number of letters to the government, but received no response. [3] In May 1999, Mr. Tran received a phone call from a Mr. Spina who said he was with the Management Board of the Ontario government. They had several discussions about the amount outstanding on the student loan. Mr. Tran disputed the number being put to him by Mr. Spina and 2000 CanLII 22621 (ON SC) requested that Mr. Spina write to him to set out the basis for the figures claimed. Initially, Mr. Spina refused, but eventually did send a demand letter dated May 20, 1999 stating the balance outstanding as $13,195.51, but providing no other particulars. The letter was written on the letterhead of the defendant Financial Debt Recovery Limited. This was the first indication Mr. Tran had that Financial Debt Recovery was involved or that Mr. Spina was not, in fact, employed by the Government of Ontario. Mr. Tran sent a response on May 29, 2000, stating: I write to respond to your letter dated May 20, 1999. First, from the letterhead, it is clear to me that you are not from the government. Had you told me about that fact at the beginning, both you and I could save a lot of time. It is now no surprise to me that you have not received any copy of the letters I send [sic] to the government. As I mentioned to you, I have been asking the government for information to clear out the issue of student loan for more than one year, but I have received no reply. They created enormous stress for me. Second, you ask me to pay what I don't own [sic]. For the good of your business, you should contact the government to return the loan under my name that you bought for possible refund. If you could ask them to respond to the request in my letters sent to them, I really appreciate [sic]. Finally, I am certain that the above issue will be solved, and I hope it will be soon, but it will be absolutely between me and the government, not you. So please do not contact me anymore. Thank you. [4] After this, employees of the defendant collection agency started to call Mr. Tran at work. I will deal in more detail with the defendant's conduct later in these Reasons. That conduct was appalling. There was a steady barrage of rude and abusive calls to the workplace. Other employees at Mr. Tran's workplace, including those at an executive level, were affected by this conduct. The telephone calls included verbal abuse, name-calling, swearing, threats of harm and outright lies. Some of these malicious falsehoods were told directly to the president of the company employing Mr. Tran. This pattern of harassment continued from June, 1999 through to the end of March, 2000. At the end of March, after receiving 7 calls of an abusive nature within half an hour, the receptionist of the company said she would call the police if the calls did not stop. She reported her concerns to her boss and the company vice-president instructed Mr. Tran to take whatever steps were necessary to stop the defendant from calling him at the office. Mr. Tran had already asked various of the defendant's employees to stop calling him at work, he had provided the defendant with his home address, home email address and home telephone number, and he had suggested to the defendant that it start a court action about the amount owing so that their dispute as to that figure could be resolved. None of his 1 Notice of Appeal filed in the Ontario Divisional Court December 1, 2000 (Court File No. 751/2000). 2000 CanLII 22621 (ON SC) entreaties had any effect whatsoever on the tactics of the defendants. Therefore, Mr. Tran commenced this action. It was only then that the harassment stopped. [5] The statement of claim was issued on April 17, 2000, and was prepared by Mr. Tran without legal assistance. The claim itself is less than a full page long. However, it particularizes a number of allegations of wrongdoing by employees of the defendant, including: making false statements to Mr. Tran's employer; harassing Mr. Tran and his colleagues by repeatedly making rude calls to the workplace; calling Mr. Tran insulting names in front of others; and threatening Mr. Tran that they would "deal with him personally". The plaintiff pleaded that the conduct of the defendant's employees caused him humiliation and stress, damaged his reputation, and deprived him of a raise and bonus from his employer in 1999. The plaintiff claimed damages of $15,000.00. [6] The defendant's solicitor delivered a statement of defence on May 17, 2000. The defence is essentially a bald denial of every aspect of the plaintiff's claim and states that the specific events set out in the statement of claim never occurred. The defence then pleads that the statement of claim does not disclose a cause of action and that there is no genuine issue for trial. The statement of defence claims costs on a solicitor-and-client basis. There are two things that are significant by their absence. First, the corporate defendant did not plead that if the events pleaded did occur, they were undertaken without the authority or approval of the defendant. Second, the defendant did not assert a counterclaim against Mr. Tran for the balance allegedly outstanding on his student loan, although it was certainly open to it to do so. The defendant brought no motions prior to the date of trial for a determination as to whether there was a cause of action or a genuine issue for trial. The plaintiff failed to deliver an affidavit of documents as required under the Rules, about which the defendant made no complaint. [7] At the outset of the trial before me, counsel for the defendant, as a preliminary issue, sought a ruling under Rule 21 dismissing the plaintiff's claim for failing to disclose a cause of action. Although no formal notice of motion for that relief had been delivered, I agreed to hear argument on the point. Following argument, I dismissed the motion for brief oral reasons delivered at the time. Essentially, I held that the statement of claim set out the prerequisites for pleading the tort of defamation and probably also for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional suffering. The defendant had argued that the plaintiff failed to plead that the defendant was vicariously liable for the actions of its employees and submitted that the action should be dismissed on that ground alone. I rejected that submission. The action was brought solely against the defendant corporation. The acts of wrongdoing alleged are all said to be done by employees of the defendant. Although the plaintiff did not go the extra step of 2000 CanLII 22621 (ON SC) specifically alleging that the corporation is liable for the actions of its employees, that is the inescapable implication of the pleading taken as a whole. I do not consider the pleading to be deficient in that regard. [8] Next, counsel for the defendant sought a ruling that the plaintiff should not be entitled to file any exhibits or call any witnesses at trial because he had failed to comply with rule 76.04. The plaintiff did not deliver any affidavit of documents and also did not provide a list of persons who might reasonably be expected to have knowledge of the matters at issue, as required by the Rules. However, the trial judge still has a discretion to permit the filing of exhibits and the calling of witnesses notwithstanding a failure to disclose. In this case, the plaintiff proposed calling only one witness, the president of the company that employs him. Counsel for the defendant was aware of this witness prior to trial. Further, none of the documents which the plaintiff wished to file as exhibits caught the defendant by surprise. The defendant was unable to point to any prejudice caused by the failure of the plaintiff to comply with the Rules for disclosure in simplified actions. I therefore dismissed the defendant's motion. [9] It is worth mentioning at this point that after the trial was underway, I learned that the defendant had itself failed to comply with the Rule requiring documentary production and did not deliver any affidavit of documents. The explanation offered was simply that the defendant would not be seeking to rely on any documents at trial. That is not the test for production. The defendant is required to disclose all documents in its possession or control relating to any matter in issue in the action. It is obvious that the defendant must have had such documents. It seems to me that the defendant, which was represented by counsel, took advantage of the fact that Mr. Tran was unrepresented in order to avoid its obligations for disclosure under the Rules. [10] The trial then proceeded before me. Mr. Tran called two witnesses, himself and Ms. Anne Marshall, the president of James P. Marshall Inc. Mr. Tran's evidence confirmed the allegations in his statement of claim as to the pattern of harassment by employees of the defendant and the effect it had upon him. He was unshaken on cross-examination. Ms. Marshall testified as to conversations she had with employees of the defendant and the effect the defendant's actions had on Mr. Tran and how he was perceived within the company. Her evidence was unshaken on cross-examination. Two telephone message slips and two letters were filed as exhibits during Mr. Tran's evidence and two slips of paper with notes in Ms. Marshall's writing were marked as exhibits during her evidence. Mr. Tran then closed his case. 2000 CanLII 22621 (ON SC) [11] The defendant called no witnesses and presented no documentary evidence. There is therefore absolutely nothing to rebut the plaintiff's evidence. I accept it in its entirety, not only because it is uncontradicted by the defendant, but also because I found Mr. Tran to be a very credible witness. He was honest and direct. He did not exaggerate or embellish. His evidence is supported by the documentation and by the evidence of the independent witness, Ms. Marshall. I also found Ms. Marshall's evidence to be credible and accurate. My findings of fact based on the evidence before me are set out below. B. FACTUAL FINDINGS [12] The first contact Mr. Tran received from the defendant company was a phone call in May, 1999, from one of its employees, Mr. Spina. During that and two subsequent discussions, Mr. Spina falsely represented to Mr. Tran that he was an employee of the Management Board of the Government of Ontario. [13] Mr. Tran had always been prepared to resume payments on his student loan and had voluntarily contacted both the bank and the government to set that up. Mr. Tran had difficulty getting full information as to the amount outstanding. He told Mr. Spina from the outset that he disputed the accuracy of the loan balance stated by Mr. Spina. He maintained this position throughout with various representatives of the defendant. However, the defendant refused to address Mr. Tran's concerns. Mr. Tran told the defendant he would be prepared to deal with the issue in a court action and suggested that the defendant commence a proceeding so that the issue of the amount owing could be determined. The defendant never did so. [14] Employees of the defendant repeatedly, and unnecessarily, called Mr. Tran at work. They were abusive and insulting to him. The nature of the telephone system at the workplace was such that calls went first through a receptionist. Both the abusive manner of the callers and the frequency of the calls were disruptive to the company's business and its employees. Mr. Tran requested on numerous occasions that the defendant stop calling him at work and he provided the defendant with his home address, e-mail and telephone number. This had no impact on the volume of calls from the defendant to the plaintiff's place of employment. [15] In July, 1999, Mr. Tran received a call at work from a Mr. Papatetrou who told him he was a lawyer with the Ontario government, spoke to him about the outstanding debt and asked to be connected with Mr. Tran's boss. Mr. Tran refused to transfer the call. 2000 CanLII 22621 (ON SC) [16] On July 21, 1999, Mr. Papatetrou called the workplace again and spoke to Ms. Anne Marshall, the president of the company. It is not clear if Mr. Papatetrou called with the intention of contacting Ms. Marshall or whether he just called the company number and she happened to answer the phone. However, Mr. Papatetrou told Ms. Marshall that he was a lawyer with the Ontario Government and that Mr. Tran owed the government money. He asked her if she was aware that Mr. Tran had applied for job with TD Securities and raised with her whether this constituted a conflict of interest. He then advised her that the Sheriff would be attending at her company within 24 hours to serve a court order. Ms. Marshall responded that she had not known that Mr. Tran was looking elsewhere for a job but that she thought that was his own business and that it did not constitute a conflict of interest. She also advised that she would, of course, comply with any court order or garnishee upon being served with the appropriate documents. [17] Mr. Papatetrou was an employee of the defendant. He was not a lawyer. He was not employed by the Government of Ontario. His statement that Mr. Tran was applying for another job was untrue. His statement that the Sheriff would be attending in 24 hours was a lie. The defendant did not have a court order. The defendant had not even commenced an action. Virtually everything said by Mr. Papatetrou was a fabrication. [18] Following her discussion with Mr. Papatetrou, Ms. Marshall called Mr. Tran into her office and told him what Mr. Papatetrou had said. She told Mr. Tran that he was free to look for other work if he chose to but that she would appreciate receiving reasonable notice. She also told him she was not pleased to be receiving this type of call and that he should ensure such calls were directed to his home in the future. Finally, she advised Mr. Tran that people were expected to pay their debts and that a call from a lawyer about this was "serious stuff". [19] Ms. Marshall testified at trial that this call from Mr. Papatetrou was irritating to her. She said that Mr. Tran was apologetic and seemed sincere when he said that he had tried to direct these type of inquiries to his home. He also denied that he was looking for other work. However, she acknowledged that this whole situation was a source of concern to her and to others within the company. As an investment firm handling large pension investment funds, the company did not wish to employ people who were having problems with their own money. She considered that Mr. Tran, if not untrustworthy, was "a titch irresponsible" or he would not be in this position. She, and other executives, were concerned about the volume of calls from the defendant which she said were sometimes as many as 10 in an hour. She was also concerned about the rudeness of the defendant's employees who called her 2000 CanLII 22621 (ON SC) company, which she experienced first-hand on more than one occasion when she answered the phones. For example, towards the end of August, Ms, Marshall had a telephone discussion with a Ms. Gascho who was an employee of the defendant. Ms. Marshall described Ms. Gascho as one of the more persistent of the callers and said she was very rude. In the conversation at the end of August, Ms. Gascho asked Ms. Marshall if she was aware that Mr. Tran had a responsibility to take her calls and suggested that Ms. Marshall was not running a good firm to let this go on. When Ms. Marshall asked that the defendant call Mr. Tran at home rather than at work, Ms. Gascho replied that it was not Ms. Marshall's prerogative to tell them where to call and that they were permitted by law to call the workplace as often as they had been. After this call, Ms. Marshall again spoke to Mr. Tran and told him to get the defendant to stop calling the office. The calls continued unabated. [20] The company's year-end was the end of October. Mr. Tran had been hired in September 1997 in an entry-level position at a salary of $28,000.00. This was raised to $29,000.00 the next month. In October 1998, Mr. Tran received a $6,000.00 raise and a $4,000.00 bonus, with the result that his compensation for that year increased to $39,000.00. The defendant started its harassment of the plaintiff in the workplace in the summer of 1999 and continued throughout the fall. In October 1999, Mr. Tran received no raise and no bonus. After Mr. Tran started this action in April 2000, the defendant's harassment stopped. In October of this year he was given a $5,000.00 raise. Bonuses have not yet been announced for 2000. [21] Mr. Tran testified that he received a number of calls at the end of March from an employee of the defendant who identified himself as Alexander, but who refused to provide a surname. Alexander yelled at him and swore at him on the phone and repeatedly called him a "stupid snaky son". During these calls, Mr. Tran could hear other people in the background laughing at the names Alexander was calling him. Alexander told Mr. Tran on two occasions on March 31, 2000 that he would "deal with him personally", a remark which Mr. Tran interpreted as a threat against his person. He found these calls very distressing. [22] Various other employees in the workplace intercepted these calls from representatives of the defendant from time to time. The person whose job responsibilities included answering the telephone was very upset by these calls. On one occasion she found the defendant's employee to be so offensive that she requested a co-worker (David) to speak to him. On March 31, after receiving 7 calls from Alexander in half an hour, the receptionist told him that if he called again, she would call the police. Mr. Tran, who was passing by her desk at the time, overheard that conversation. The receptionist then 2000 CanLII 22621 (ON SC) advised Mr. Tran that she was going to have to report the situation to the vice-president, which she did. This precipitated the direction from the vice-president to Mr. Tran that he must do something to solve the problem (as I referred to in paragraph 4 above). C. ANALYSIS [23] The plaintiff, not being versed in the law, simply put the facts of his case before the court and requested relief. Essentially, he saw his cause of action as being based on harassment by the defendant and his damages as flowing from emotional suffering, damage to his reputation and loss of income. It seems to me that the potential causes of action arising from the facts proven at trial are defamation, intentional infliction of emotional harm, interference with economic interests, threatening bodily harm and invasion of privacy. I alerted counsel for the defendant to all of those possibilities, with the exception of invasion of privacy, and invited his submissions. [24] Regrettably, counsel for the defendant was of no assistance to the Court on the legal issues. He had come to trial prepared to address only the issue of defamation. He submitted no case authority for my consideration on any point raised. The potential causes of action are easily ascertainable from the statement of claim. There were no surprises at trial. The evidence in support of the plaintiff's case was precisely as outlined in the pleading. Therefore, if the defendant was unprepared to deal with the issues of law raised, that is its own fault. Defamation [25] In order to recover damages for defamation a plaintiff must prove that the words complained of were published, that the words complained of refer to the plaintiff and that the words complained of are defamatory of the plaintiff. Words are considered to be defamatory if they tend to lower a person in the estimation of right-thinking members of society: Gatley on Libel and Slander, 9th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1997) at p. 7; Botiuk v. Toronto Free Press Publications Ltd, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 3 at 24, 126 D.L.R. (4th) 609; Cherneskey v. Armadale Publishers Ltd., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 1067 at 1079, 90 D.L.R. (3d) 321. [26] The defendant argues that the comments and name-calling by Alexander on the telephone to Mr. Tran do not give rise to liability because they were not published. I disagree. It was clear to Mr. Tran from his end of the line that Alexander was making these derogatory statements about him to the general merriment of other employees of the defendant who could hear Alexander's end of the conversation. However, it is not clear that those individuals who heard the conversation knew that the 2000 CanLII 22621 (ON SC) remarks related to Mr. Tran. An argument could be made that it is reasonable to draw an inference to that effect, especially given the failure of the defendant to call any evidence to rebut it. However, I have decided against doing so. Any damages for this particular act of defamation would not be extensive in any event given the limited extent of the publication and the persons to whom the publication was made. [27] The statements made by Mr. Papatetrou to Ms. Marshall are, however, clearly actionable. Mr. Papatetrou told Ms. Marshall that Mr. Tran had applied for another job and suggested that this put him in a position of conflict of interest. There was an innuendo created that Mr. Tran was therefore a disloyal and unreliable employee. Mr. Papatetrou also told Ms. Marshall that the Sheriff would be attending at the workplace to serve a court order, thereby giving the impression that there was in fact a judgment against Mr. Tran for failing to pay a debt. The statements made by Mr. Paptetrou were untrue. Counsel for the defendant conceded that they are defamatory. I agree. Ms. Marshall herself acknowledged that she thought less of Mr. Tran as a result of this call from Mr. Papatetrou. [28] Thus, the evidence establishes all of the requisite elements of the tort of defamation. Upon proof of the tort, damages flow: Gatley on Libel and Slander, supra at p. 11. As stated by the Supreme Court in Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 at 1196, 126 D.L.R. (4th) 129: "It has long been held that general damages in defamation cases are presumed from the very publication of the false statement and are awarded at large." It is not necessary to prove specific damages, although if special damages can be shown, they are also compensable. The defendant argues that the plaintiff's general damages for defamation should be at the low end of the scale because he was a recent graduate without a well-established reputation and because of the limited extent of the publication of the defamation. The application of that reasoning to this case is flawed. Although the defendant did not publish its defamatory statements to the whole world, it chose the one person in the world to whom publication would have the most devastating impact on the plaintiff, his employer. In assessing damages, the nature of the audience may be more important that its size: Raymond E. Brown, The Law of Defamation in Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1994) at p. 27-72.2. In Hill, supra, the Supreme Court noted the uniqueness of each libel case, stating at para. 187: The assessment of damages in a libel case flows from a particular confluence of the following elements: the nature and circumstances of the publication of the libel, the nature and position of the victim of the libel, the possible effects of the libel statement upon the life of the plaintiff, and the actions and motivations of the defendants. 2000 CanLII 22621 (ON SC) Mr. Tran was a recently hired employee. This was his first real job in his chosen career. He was working in the field of finance. He had yet to develop a proven track record of responsibility and loyalty to his employer. He was therefore particularly vulnerable at this time and in this kind of workplace to the kind of defamation perpetrated by the defendant. Ironically, it was because he was a recent graduate that the defendant's attack on his reputation was particularly harmful. In addition, defamation related to one's profession is particularly harmful and should be reflected in the award of damages: Schultz v. Porter (1979), 9 Alta. L.R. (2d) 381 (S.C.), where the court stated at p. 400 that the fact that the plaintiff's "commercial and professional reputation was directly involved merits an award of damages substantially higher than would be the case if the defamation did not involve economic consequences". How closely the defamation touches the core elements of a person's personality, and his or her integrity, professional reputation, and loyalty are key considerations in awarding damages: Gatley, supra at p. 202.I will deal below with the quantum of damages in more detail. Intentional Interference with Economic Interests [29] The essential elements of the tort of intentional interference with economic interests were confirmed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Lineal Group Inc. v. Atlantis Canadian Distributors Inc. (1998), 42 O.R. (3d) 157, quoting the following excerpt from the decision of Corbett J. in Daishowa Inc. v. Friends of the Lubicon (1996), 27 O.R. (3d) 215 at 230, 29 C.C.L.T. (2d) 76 at 93 (Div. Ct.) (leave to appeal to the Ont. C.A. refused April 24, 1996, Doc. CAM 17675): The tort of intentional interference with contractual relations and economic interests requires the plaintiff to prove: (1) an intention to injure the plaintiff; (2) interference with another's method of gaining his or her living or business by illegal means; see International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 213 v. Therien, [1960] S.C.R. 265 at 280, 22 D.L.R. (2d) 1; and (3) economic loss occasioned thereby. [30] In my opinion, the evidence in this case establishes that the defendant committed this tort. The defendant argues that there is no direct evidence of intent to injure. It is certainly the case that there was no direct evidence from the defendant as to its intention in respect of the actions taken against Mr. Tran. The defendant called no evidence at all. However, what other possible reason can the defendant have had in calling the president of the company employing Mr. Tran and fabricating a story that Mr. Tran had applied for a job at another company? Why suggest that Mr. Tran was in a position 2000 CanLII 22621 (ON SC) of conflict of interest based on that fabricated story? Why tell the president of the company that the Sheriff will be coming to serve court orders when there was not even an action started? It is a reasonable, indeed perhaps an inescapable, inference from that conduct that the defendant intended to put pressure on the defendant by getting him into trouble with his employer. Further, the defendant's constant and extreme harassment of the plaintiff at work must have been directed towards the same end. I can and do draw an adverse inference from the defendant's unexplained failure to call any evidence. I find as a fact that the defendant intended to injure the plaintiff. [31] It is obvious that the defendant's conduct interfered with Mr. Tran's ability to earn a living. Mr. Tran was constantly being interrupted and distracted at work by harassing telephone calls from the defendant's employees. He testified that his ability to concentrate and his memory were adversely affected. In addition, the defendant's conduct affected other people at Mr. Tran's place of employment, a factor that made his relationships with co-workers more difficult. Both the president and vicepresident of the company were required to speak to Mr. Tran about the problems being caused in the workplace by the defendant. [32] The defendant used illegal means in the course of this interference with Mr. Tran's work. Some of the statements made by the defendant's representatives were untrue and defamatory, as I have stated above. Further, the defendant's conduct was a violation of several provisions of the Regulations under the Collection Agencies Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.14, the statute by which companies such as the defendant are supposed to be governed. Sections 20 and 21 of those Regulations, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 74, set out certain prohibited practices and methods in the collection of debts. The defendant's conduct breached s. 20(d) which prohibits making "telephone calls or personal calls of such nature or with such frequency as to constitute harassment of the debtor". Both the nature and frequency of the phone calls constituted harassment. The defendant's conduct also breached section 20(f), which prohibits giving "any person, directly or indirectly, by implication or otherwise, any false or misleading information that may be detrimental to a debtor". The defendant's action in contacting Mr. Tran's employer was also prohibited by s. 21 of the Regulation. Therefore, I find that the defendant interfered with Mr. Tran's work by illegal means. [33] Finally, the plaintiff has established economic loss as a result of the defendant's actions. I will deal with this issue in more detail below under the heading "Damages". For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that Mr. Tran received a significant raise and bonus in his first year of work. In 1999, the year in which the defendant's harassment of Mr. Tran began, he got no raise and no bonus. Ms. Marshall 2000 CanLII 22621 (ON SC) acknowledged in her evidence that the actions of the defendant were a factor in the decision not to give Mr. Tran a raise or bonus in 1999. Thus, Mr. Tran has proven actual economic loss as a result of the defendant's actions. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Harm [34] Intentional infliction of emotional harm is a tort recognized in Canadian law and has been applied in the debt-collection context: Bateman v. Newcourt Credit Group Inc., [1995] O.J. No. 325 (QL) (Gen. Div.) [summarized 53 A.C.W.S. (3d) 279]. The essential elements required to establish the tort are: (1) an intention to harm the plaintiff; (2) an overt act for which there is no legal justification; and (3) mental suffering caused to the plaintiff as a result: Radovoskis v. Tomm (1957), 9 D.L.R. (2d) 751 at 756; Blumas v. Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ontario, [2000] O.J. No. 3108 (QL) at para 16 (Sup. Ct.) [summarized 99 A.C.W.S. (3d) 168]; Bateman v. Newcourt Credit Group Inc., supra, at para 9. [35] As I stated above, the nature of the defendant's conduct was such that the only reasonable inference is that the defendant intended to injure the plaintiff. It is also apparent that the campaign of harassment was specifically designed to put the plaintiff in a situation of such stress that he would capitulate to the defendant's demands. There was, therefore, a deliberate attempt to cause emotional suffering to the plaintiff. [36] There is no justification for the behaviour of the defendant. The defendant's employees lied about their own identities, fabricated defamatory stories about the plaintiff, harassed the plaintiff at work, harassed other employees at the plaintiff's office, threatened physical harm to the plaintiff, called him offensive names and generally humiliated him. Their conduct was not only reprehensible, it was illegal under their licensing statute. [37] The plaintiff testified that the actions of the defendant caused him emotional suffering. He was depressed and anxious. He felt humiliated in front of his fellow workers and his employer. He became worried about his job. He was unable to concentrate and began to have memory problems. He lost weight. Mr. Tran did not seek medical treatment for his anxiety. Instead, he tried to deal with his emotional state through physical exercise and meditation. I accept Mr. Tran's evidence as to the genuine nature of his emotional suffering. I agree with his statement (made during cross-examination) that just because he is not the type to turn to a doctor for help, does not mean he is not suffering. I find that Mr. Tran did suffer emotional harm as a result of the defendant's wrongful acts. It is not necessary 2000 CanLII 22621 (ON SC) that such harm amount to a psychiatric condition before it can be compensable: Mason v. Westside Cemeteries Ltd. (1996), 135 D.L.R. (4th) 361; Peters-Brown v. Regina District Health Board (1996), 31 C.C.L.T. (2d) 302 (Sask. C.A.); Anderson v. Wilson (1997), 32 O.R. (3d) 400 (Gen. Div.); Vanek v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada, [1997] O.J. No. 3304 (QL) (Gen. Div.) [reported 39 O.T.C. 54]. The severity of the emotional harm is a factor determining the quantum of damages. Invasion of Privacy [38] In addition to his right to damages for the torts of defamation, intentional interference with business interests and intentional infliction of emotional harm, I believe the facts of this case are sufficient to warrant damages for the tort of invasion of privacy. Although this cause of action is a relatively recent innovation in the law of torts, there are numerous decisions which have recognized its validity: Allen M. Linden, Canadian Tort Law, 6th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1997) at pp. 55-59; Motherwell v. Motherwell (1976), 73 D.L.R. (3d) 62 (Alta. C.A.); Saccone v. Orr (1982), 34 O.R. (2d) 317 (Co. Ct.); Lipiec v. Borsa, [1996] O.J. No. 3819 (QL) (Gen. Div.) [reported 31 C.C.L.T. (2d) 294]; Garrett v. Mikalachki, [2000] O.J. No. 1326 (QL) (Sup. Ct.) [summarized 96 A.C.W.S. (3d) 239]. There have also been cases in which the tort of invasion of privacy has been used to find liability in the context of harassment by a debt collector: C.R.B. Dunlop, Creditor-Debtor Law in Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1995) at 55-59; S.A. Nagy Farm Ltd. v. Repsys, [1987] O.J. No. 1987 (QL) (Dist. Ct.) [summarized 4 A.C.W.S. (3d) 100]; Palad v. Pantaleon, [1989] O.J. No. 985 (QL) (Dist. Ct.); Dawe v. Nova Collection Services (Nfld.) Ltd., [1998] N.J. No. 22 (QL) (Nfld. Prov. Ct.) [reported 160 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 266]. Established Causes of Action [39] Accordingly, I find that Mr. Tran has proven a case entitling him to recover damages from the defendant for the torts of defamation, intentional interference with economic interests, intentional infliction of emotional suffering, and invasion of privacy. In these circumstances, it is unnecessary for me to deal with whether the threats of bodily harm made by Alexander might also constitute the tort of assault. Any emotional suffering caused by such threats is already covered within the tort of intentional infliction of emotional suffering. D. DAMAGES The Plaintiff's Position 2000 CanLII 22621 (ON SC) [40] Mr. Tran's statement of claim seeks damages in the amount of $15,000.00. He testified that he had difficulty coming up with a way to quantify his damages. He arrived at the figure he did based on three factors: his loss of income in 1999; the time he spent per day doing exercise and meditation in order to relieve the stress caused by the defendant; and a modest amount to compensate him for the loss of weight, loss of memory and humiliation caused by the defendant. [41] With respect to loss of income, Mr. Tran estimated that he would likely have received at least $7,000 as a raise and bonus in 1999. He then pointed out that the real loss goes far beyond the amount of the raise, as the absence of an increase in 1999 affects salary increases every year thereafter. He reasoned that if the yearly raise is conservatively estimated at 4% to cover the increase in the cost of living and that calculation is carried forward to the normal retirement age of 65, the real loss of not receiving the raise in 1999 comes to approximately $29,000.00. He stated that he recognized the full amount of this loss was not reasonably recoverable, but that it should be taken into account in considering the reasonableness of the damages he was actually claiming. [42] Mr. Tran estimated his damages for stress and emotional suffering based on the amount of time he was required to spend each day to deal with that problem. He said that, over and above his usual level of exercise, he spent about one hour every day engaged in meditation and exercise designed to relieve the effects of the defendant's harassment on his emotional well-being. This continued for 10 months, for a total of 300 hours over that period. Mr. Tran testified that clients are usually charged between $60.00 to $80.00 for his professional services. He therefore felt it was reasonable to value the time he spent dealing with his emotional stress at $30.00 an hour, for a total of $9,000.00. In addition to this calculation based on lost time, Mr. Tran proposed an additional amount of damages to compensate him for the loss of weight, memory problems and humiliation he experienced over that 10-month period. He suggested that figure should be at least $2,000.00 but confessed that he was not sure how that should be calculated. [43] Mr. Tran therefore felt that his damages were actually at about $40,000.00. However, he arbitrarily reduced that amount to $15,000.00 because he did not want to appear unreasonable. The Defendant's Position [44] The defendant submitted that, based on the evidence of Ms. Marshall, the plaintiff's claim for special damages should be limited to 10% of the raise and bonus he would otherwise have received. This, it was said, would amount to only $1,000.00. Defence counsel limited his submissions with 2000 CanLII 22621 (ON SC) respect to general damages to those flowing from the defamation. He argued that those damages should be between $1,000.00 and $2,000.00 because of the narrow scope of publication and the fact that the plaintiff was a recent graduate without an established business reputation. The defendant also urged that general damages be assessed globally for all causes of action, rather than broken down between the various torts, because of the overlapping nature of the facts contributing to each cause of action. Loss of Income [45] It was reasonable for Mr. Tran to conclude that as a result of the defendant's actions he lost approximately $7,000.00 in 1999. The year before, Mr. Tran had received a raise of $6,000.00 and a bonus of $4,000.00. In 2000, after the defendant stopped its harassment, Mr. Tran has been advised he will receive a raise of $5,000.00. Bonuses have not yet been announced. Ms. Marshall testified that Mr. Tran was not given a raise or bonus in 1999 because of performance issues and his interpersonal relationships with other employees. She acknowledged that the situation with the defendant had an impact, which she estimated at 10%. She did not point to any specific other problems with Mr. Tran that would have contributed to that decision. In my opinion, it is not possible to simply adopt the 10% figure as the actual assessment of income loss. Ms. Marshall was quite candid in acknowledging it as a factor at all. However, the problem was not just the extent to which the employer was aggravated by the defendant. There is also the fact that the defendant's actions affected Mr. Tran's job performance (inability to concentrate, anxiety, memory problems, distractions at work) as well as his ability to deal well with his peers. He testified that he felt humiliated by the defendant's calls which were known to everyone in the workplace and that this made it difficult for him to interact with them. Also, as Mr. Tran pointed out, the absence of a raise in 1999 affected the base amount from which all future raises would be calculated and therefore has an ongoing and cumulative effect. It is difficult to put a specific dollar amount on the loss of income. However, I would fix $10,000.00 as a reasonable estimate of the total loss. This is a recoverable head of damages as special damages for defamation as well as under the tort of intentional interference with economic interests. General Damages for Defamation [46] As I mentioned above, Mr. Tran did not have any legal assistance in drafting his claim. He was unaware, for example, that it is not necessary to prove actual monetary loss in order to recover damages for defamation. In this case, there were a number of factors supporting a general damage award toward the upper ranges. As I mentioned above, although the publication of the defamation was not broad, it was directed to the plaintiffs employer, which exacerbated its detrimental effect on the plaintiff. Also, 2000 CanLII 22621 (ON SC) the plaintiff, as a new employee, was in a particularly vulnerable position to be damaged by the defamation because he did not have an established record and reputation with his employer. Finally, Mr. Tran is a financial analyst employed by a company handling large investment accounts. The subject matter of the defamation related to his profession and undermined not only his general good name but also his professional reputation. There is also direct evidence that the defamation did cause others to think less of Mr. Tran and damaged his reputation with senior personnel at his workplace. These factors, in my opinion, have the effect of increasing the quantum of damages beyond what might otherwise be the case for similar words with limited publication. In my view, an appropriate award for general damages for defamation (independent of other causes of action) is $20,000.00. General Damages for Emotional Suffering [47] The plaintiff is also entitled to damages for the emotional suffering caused by the tortious acts of the defendants. The plaintiff's method of calculation is not the conventional way of determining general damages. That is not to say, however, that it is without logical force or, for that matter, that the conventional method is any more scientific than Mr. Tran's calculation. It does make sense to assess damages based on the impact particular conduct has had on the plaintiff's day-to-day life. Part of that impact is the time the plaintiff was required to spend on coping mechanisms to reduce the effects of the stress caused by the defendant, which I accept was about one hour every day. In addition to this, there was the day-to-day stress in the workplace caused by the defendant's harassment and the resulting humiliation and frustration. It must immediately be recognized, however, that although the actions of the defendant were extreme, Mr. Tran did, on the whole, cope well. The impact on him was not extreme and since general damages are aimed at compensation, not punishment, it is the impact on the plaintiff which is the determining factor. Taking all of this into account, I would assess Mr. Tran's damages for emotional suffering (over and above the general damages for defamation) at $10,000.00. Damages Recoverable by the Plaintiff [48] Mr. Tran claimed damages of $15,000.00. The total damage award I have assessed is $40,000.00. I have assessed damages for emotional suffering and loss of income at $20,000.00, which is already in excess of Mr. Tran's claim. In addition, however, Mr. Tran would be entitled to damages for defamation which I have assessed at a further $20,000.00. Mr. Tran was unaware of his right to make such a claim, but all of the particulars supporting the claim are pleaded. The defendant was fully aware of the claim, came to trial prepared to address the defamation issue, and was represented by counsel. I alerted counsel for the defendant to the possibility that my damage assessment might exceed 2000 CanLII 22621 (ON SC) $15,000.00 and asked for his submissions with respect to an amendment of the statement of claim to increase the damages to $25,000.00 to conform with the damage assessment if necessary. This action was commenced under the Simplified Rules, which are limited to claims of under $25,000.00. It is clear to me that awarding damages in excess of $25,000.00 would be unfair and prejudicial to the defendant given the procedural differences in Simplified Rules matters. Defence counsel was unable to point to any prejudice to the defendant if the statement of claim was amended to increase the damages claimed to $25,000.00. Damages If Assessed Globally [49] There is some merit to the defendant's position that damages should be assessed on a global basis rather than being broken down on a tort-by-tort basis. There are overlapping matters between the various torts, particularly with respect to the damages for emotional suffering. In a number of cases, the same facts can give rise to liability under a number of different heads of damages. For example, although I have indicated a separate quantum of damages for defamation (which includes some component of the distress suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the defamation), I recognize that it is somewhat artificial to assess a separate amount for emotional suffering caused by other conduct of the defendant. The plaintiff's emotional suffering resulted from the combination of factors, all of which together make up his damages. Thus, the defamation, and the consequent damage to his reputation, was a contributing factor to the overall emotional suffering caused to Mr. Tran. Certainly, there should not be double-counting, so that the defendant is paying damages twice for the same conduct. However, I have been careful to avoid double recovery in the assessments I set out above. For present purposes, it is not necessary to define the amount of global damages with precision. Suffice to say that if I were simply to assess general damages on a global basis without regard to the specific tort claims, my assessment would still be in excess of $25,000.00. E. CONCLUSION Judgment [50] In my view, justice requires the amendment of the statement of claim to reflect something closer to the damages to which Mr. Tran is entitled. I am particularly swayed by the following: (a) Mr. Tran was unrepresented by counsel and unaware of his rights; (b) the defendant was represented by counsel; 2000 CanLII 22621 (ON SC) (c) the defendant's conduct towards Mr. Tran was deliberate and flagrantly abusive; (d) there is no claim for punitive damages, although one might well be supported by the evidence; (e) there is no prejudice to the defendant, provided that the claim is not amended beyond the monetary jurisdiction of the Simplified Rules. Accordingly, the statement of claim is amended to increase the quantum of damages claimed to $25,000.00 and judgment is granted to the plaintiff in that amount. Costs [51] With respect to costs, the defendant submits that Mr. Tran should not be entitled to recover anything more than his disbursements because he was not represented by a solicitor. It is now well settled that a self-represented lay litigant is not automatically disentitled to costs, including a counsel fee: Fong v. Chan (1999), 46 O.R. (3d) 330, 181 D.L.R. (4th) 614 (C.A.). This is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge. However, the plaintiff is not entitled to compensation for time that would have been required of him as a litigant, e.g. time spent in court for the trial itself. Mr. Tran had disbursements of approximately $300.00. He took a day off work to prepare for and attend the pretrial at a cost to him of $180.00, which I think should be recovered. He also lost a day's pay for the time spent at trial. However, this would have been required of him even if he had a lawyer and is therefore not recoverable. Finally, there was some time spent in preparing the claim, arranging service of pleadings, attending at the court office on numerous occasions to file documents, and various letters and phone calls. I estimate all of those matters combined at the equivalent of two days' work and allow a counsel fee in that regard of $360.00. Accordingly, costs are awarded to the plaintiff fixed at $840.00. Potential Set-Off Claim [52] It was open to the defendant to have asserted a counterclaim in this action for the recovery of the student loan debt. Indeed, it would have been preferable for the defendant to have done so in light of the spirit of the Rules of Civil Practice which discourage a multiplicity of proceedings and encourage litigants to resolve all matters of dispute between them in the same proceeding. Further, the plaintiff has repeatedly advised the defendant that he disputes the amount of the claim advanced and asked the defendant to justify its claim. The plaintiff even requested the defendant to start an action so that the correct figure could be resolved. In these circumstances, it would inequitable for the defendant to simply deduct from the amount of this judgment, the full amount which it claims to be owing on the debt, and to then remit only the difference to the plaintiff. I am therefore ordering that the defendant is 2000 CanLII 22621 (ON SC) not entitled to set-off its claim on the student loan debt against this judgment unless with the consent of the plaintiff or further order of the court. Other Matters [53] The defendant is directed to send a copy of these Reasons to the principal government representative with whom it has dealt in relation to Mr. Tran's student loan. [54] The defendant is hereby advised that I have caused a copy of these Reasons to be sent, without comment, to the Registrar of Collection Agencies. Judgment for plaintiff. 2000 CanLII 22621 (ON SC)

Warman v. Grosvenor., 2008

Warman v. Grosvenor

92 O.R. (3d) 663

Ontario Superior Court of Justice,

Ratushny J.

October 20, 2008

[1] RATUSHNY J.: --Theplaintiff seeks to stopthedefendant's two-year "campaign of terror" against him, achieved through postings ontheInternet and personal e-mails.

[2]Theplaintiff is a lawyer who works fortheGovernment of Canada and resides in Ottawa, Ontario. He is involved in extensive human rights work relating to hate propaganda ontheInternet.

[3]Thedefendant resides in Edmonton, Alberta.

[4]Theplaintiff requests general, aggravated and punitive damages inthetotal amount of $50,000 fordefamation, assault and invasion of privacy. He also requests a complete retraction ofthedefendant's defamatory comments and a permanent injunction.

Procedural Background

[5]TheStatement of Claim was issued on January 14, 2008 and personally served onthedefendant on January 15, 2008.

[6]Thedefendant served a Notice of Intent to Defend on February 21, 2008, but failed to ever file a defence. He was noted in default on March 11, 2008.

[7]Theplaintiff next brought a motion for judgment pursuant torule 19.05oftheRules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194(the"Rules"). For reasons set out in her Endorsement dated July 18, 2008, Toscano-Roccamo J. of this court orderedtheaction proceed to trial and oral evidence be presented.

[8]Theplaintiff testified at trial. He introduced additional evidence to that contained in his affidavit dated June 30, 2008 (the"affidavit") and intheoriginal motion record. In his testimony, he reviewedthecontents of various Internet postings and personal e-mails. He explained, as he had already stated intheaffidavit, why he believedthedefendant wastheauthor of allthepostings ontheInternet entered into evidence at trial (the"postings") andthee-mails sent directly to him, also as admitted as evidence at trial (the"e- mails"). He spoke oftheimportance to him of his reputation as a lawyer and ofthehorror and fear he experiences because of these postings and e-mails. He saidthedefendant has [page667] continued his campaign against him up tothepresent time. He describedthedefendant's comments as vicious, violent and malevolent. He said he has never, except through his counsel in this action, made any contact whatsoever withthedefendant. Deemed Admission of Facts

[9] Becausethedefendant has been noted in default,theRulesdeem him to have admittedthetruth of all allegations of fact made intheStatement of Claim:rule 19.02(1).

[10] However,theRulesalso make it clear thattheplaintiff is not entitled to judgment merely becausethefacts alleged intheStatement of Claim are deemed to be admitted, unless those facts entitletheplaintiff to judgment:rule 19.06.

[11] In other words, as I understand rule 19.06 andtheplaintiff's submissions including his reliance onUmlauf v. Umlauf(2001),2001 CanLII 24068 (ON CA), 53 O.R. (3d) 355, [2001] O.J. No. 1054 (C.A.), whilethefacts deemed admitted must show alltherequired elements of each tort alleged for there to be liability,the"facts going to liability are deemed to be true butthefacts going to damages must be proven":Umlauf, at para.9. Identification oftheDefendant

[12] I did have some initial concerns as tothereliability oftheplaintiff's identification ofthedefendant astheauthor ofthepostings andthee-mails, notwithstandingthedeemed admission ofthetruth oftheallegations by virtue oftheoperation oftheRules, which arguably could be said to only amount to deemed admissions by a defendant called William Grosvenor, without there being an evidentiary link to establish thattheperson who was served withtheStatement of Claim wasthesame person who wastheauthor ofthepostings andthee- mails.

[13] My review oftheevidence satisfies me, however, thattheplaintiff has provedthedefendant to betheauthor ofthepostings andthee-mails. I accepttheplaintiff's analysis oftheissue of identification contained in paras. 11-18 oftheaffidavit, as supplemented by his evidence at trial.

[14]Thefollowing evidence is particularly persuasive. In 1996 by way of an Internet posting, a person who identified himself as William Grosvenor called on "mature ladies" to contact him at a certain address in Edmonton. This wasthesame address used to servetheStatement of Claim onthedefendant withthesame name.Thedefendant ofthesame name responded, giving this same address in his Notice of Intent to Defend.Thee-mails began on January 16, 2008, which wastheday aftertheStatement of [page668] Claim had been served onthedefendant.Thefirst ofthee-mails repeated, inthesame words,theinvitation to others to harmtheplaintiff andthelinks totheplaintiff's former home address combined with an aerial photograph, as had been contained in some oftheprevious postings.Thefurther e-mails have continued some ofthesame patterns exhibited bythepostings in terms of their style, content and obsessions. Summary oftheAdmitted Facts

[15]Thepostings bythedefendant began, as far astheplaintiff is aware, inthespring of 2006 and they continue to be made atthepresent time.Thepostings have been published throughout Canada andtheworld by way of Google Web site groups, Mailgate website groups and NNTP2HTTO.com Web site groups.Theplaintiff understandstheservers for these website groups are in California U.S.A, Italy and Germany respectively.

[16]Thefirst posting fromthedefendant, as referred to intheStatement of Claim, is dated August 25, 2006. It containsthefollowing words (they are an excerpt only) that were then posted ontheInternet bythedefendant at least 11 times:

I mean, what does Warman think? That we're just going to let him imprison and harass and victimize people while we stand by and smile? Let him meet his just fate -- execution atthehands of a people's government.

[17]Thesecond posting fromthedefendant, as referred to intheStatement of Claim, is dated September 7, 2006. It containsthefollowing words (they are an excerpt only) that were then posted ontheInternet bythedefendant at least three times:

"Richard Warman Address -- To Get Protests -- He Wants Lots of Visitors"

Warman, Canadians don't need government babysitters to tell us what to think or what websites we should read. Stop your hate crimes againsttheCanadian people, we don't need Zionazis thought enforcement ontheinternet when you bastards control most ofthemedia. You just create backlash that lets people seetheZionazis for what they really are -- actually, never mind, keep trying to suppress free speech so at least Canadians can see you scumbags for what you are.

We got an email today from a Canadian comrade saying he is planning ARA-style protests outside ofthecommunist co-op that Richard Warman calls home.

[18]Thethird posting fromthedefendant, as referred to intheStatement of Claim, is dated October 3, 2006. It containsthesame words referred to intheabove excerpt as were inthesecond posting.Thedefendant then posted these words ontheInternet at least 18 times.

[19]Thefourth posting fromthedefendant, as referred to intheStatement of Claim, is dated December 29, 2006. It contains [page669]thefollowing words (they are an excerpt only) that were then posted ontheInternet bythedefendant at least 14 times:

"Richard Warman Wants Lots of Visitors, Callers -- Repost"

You just create backlash that lets people seetheZionazis for what they really are -- actually, never mind, keep trying to suppress free speech so at least Canadians can see you scumbags for what you are.

. . . protests outside ofthecommunist co-op that Richard Warman calls home.

[20]Thefifth posting fromthedefendant, as referred to intheStatement of Claim, is dated November 10, 2007. It containsthefollowing words (they are an excerpt only) that were then posted ontheInternet bythedefendant at least six times:

"Canada Awake!TheTime To Cast Off Your Chains Is Now"

A gay gook named Fo Niemi recruited Jew hatemonger Richard Warman for that purpose. These are not average Canadians -- but they are officials in your government. And they are not out to preserve your human rights, but to strip you of your humanity. There is no crime against white people thattheCanadian government will not protect.

In fact,theCanadian government is organizing crime. This same Jew attorney, Richard Warman, hired a bus and organizedthemob that attacked Paul Fromm at his home. He has been organizing and financing vigilante mobs who attacks critics of Jewish power for years. He is a gangster and an organized crime figure -- but he is one acting undertheprotection oftheJews.

[21]Thesixth posting fromthedefendant, as referred to intheStatement of Claim, is dated September 22, 2007. It containsthefollowing words (they are an excerpt only) that were then posted ontheInternet bythedefendant at least once:

"Faggoty-looking lawyer crusades AGAINST free speech"

To find out more about this communist, scumbag menace to free expression, just do Google search on his name. And then pay him a visit . . .

[22]Thesixth posting then goes on to givetheplaintiff's correct residential address atthetime, his phone number, aerial photos and a map of how to get to his residence, andthecontact details forthemanagement of that co-op residence, saying "Encourage your readers to emailtheco-op and complain about their resident (he may get kicked out if they get enough complaints)".

[23]Theseventh posting fromthedefendant, as referred to intheStatement of Claim, is dated September 23, 2007. It containsthefollowing words (they are an excerpt only) that were then posted ontheInternet bythedefendant at least six times: [page670]

He's a dead Jew walkin'

He's a dead Jew walkin'. . .

It's just a dead Jew talkin'

He had a job, he had a boyfriend, . . .

Like a dead Jew walkin' . . .

To find out more about this communist, scumbag menace to free expression, just do Google search on his name. And then pay him a visit . . .

Employer: Bernie "Superkike" Farber, Canadian Jewish Congress. Mugshots ofthewhite nigger can be found here: . . .

[24]Theeighth posting fromthedefendant, as referred to intheStatement of Claim, is dated September 19, 2007. It containsthewords referred to above inthefourth posting.Thedefendant then posted these words ontheInternet at least eight more times.

[25]Theninth posting fromthedefendant, as referred to intheStatement of Claim, is dated October 12, 2007. It containsthefollowing words (they are an excerpt only) that were then posted ontheInternet bythedefendant at least 200 times:

"Why are ZYDs/Jews So Hated Worldwide?"

When creatures such as Richard Warman usetheCanadian Human Right Commission to persecute individuals for having a different political opinion, or even for being politically incorrect,thepeople who THINK start wondering aboutthetruth of much that Warman and his ilk are promulgating!

[26]Thetenth posting fromthedefendant, as referred to intheStatement of Claim, is dated October 15, 2007. It containsthewords referred to above intheseventh posting.Thedefendant then posted these words ontheInternet at least eight more times.

[27]Theeleventh posting fromthedefendant, as referred to intheStatement of Claim, is dated October 19, 2007. It containsthefollowing words (they are an excerpt only) that were then posted ontheInternet bythedefendant at least once:

Mamzer Warman likes litigating people whomthejews have targeted in Canada. He derives pleasure in hurting people financially for mere words are not libelous but not friendly tothekike agenda Warman serves. He's a disgusting maggot.

[28]Thetwelfth posting fromthedefendant, as referred to intheStatement of Claim, is dated November 8, 2007. It containsthefollowing words (they are an excerpt only) that were then posted ontheInternet bythedefendant at least six times: [page671]

"Tricky Dick" Warman and His War On Dissent

No wonder people consider this creature almost sub-human . . .

This man holds between his earstheprototypical Jewish extremist mind with its paranoia, its almost inbred disgust fortheGentile and his culture, its power-mad delusion of dog-like control overthemasses, its "inalienable right" not to be offended, its reflexive and intractable totalitarianism (theBolshevik brain) andtheborderline personality disorder of so many Jewish power-players inthezealous Zionist crime syndicate . . .

How does Dick Warman, either crypto-Jew or Shoddy Goy, playthepimp for Big Jewry so effectively? Simple. He is part oftheGovernment/Jewry Complex . . .

To find out more about this communist, scumbag menace to free expression, just do Google search on his name. And then pay him a visit . . .

[29]Thetwelfth posting, as inthesixth posting referred to above, liststheplaintiff's address and urges people to contact that address's management personnel.

[30]Thethirteenth posting fromthedefendant, as referred to intheStatement of Claim, is dated November 9, 2007. It containsthefollowing words (they are an excerpt only) that were then posted ontheInternet bythedefenda