Question: What is your narrative reflection about Arroyo administration?

debate instead came to focus on the distributional gap and a challenge to the politi- cal system to redeem longstanding social claims. The Macapagal-Arroyo administration was also hobbled by the circumstances by which it had come to power. Owing to the need to cement shaky alliances in the face of legal and extra-constitutional challenges to legitimacy, and the prospect of a re-election bid,\" a number of the president's alliances and appointments were based on political loyalties and quid pro quo rather than {or in addition to) tness or prin- ciple. in particular, the military and the police, whose shift in allegiance had been pivotal in deposing Estrada, were largely left to run their own affairs. The adminis- tration seemed unwilling or unable to apply pressure on the military and police to perform, notwithstanding the deterioration in peace and order {as seen in rising cases of kidnapping, drugs, and gambling). It was in particular the feeklessness of local police and the military in bringing the Abu Sayyaf terror group to justice that ultimately led to a call for US. troops to participate in ostensible \"war exercises," with the very real objective of decimating the group and freeing its captives. While the United States viewed this as an exten- sion of its global \"war on terror,\" the Macapagal-Arroyo administration used the closer alliance with the United States to strengthen its legitimacy in the face of chals icnges from pro-Estrada forces, even as the obtrusive and extended presence of American troops reopened old debates about sovereignty and undue foreign inu- ence on policy. The latter widened the split between the administration and the ide- ologically oriented civil society groups that had initially supported it. Thus, early in its term the administration confronted the task of meeting popular expectations for a rapid improvement in people's lives, when the only means of doing so involved resolving deepseated problems that would take years to accomplish. Whether and how to bridge this gap and still ensure its political survival beyond the 2004 elections was the difcult choice the administration needed to make. 2.7 THE DILEMMA 0F NORMALCY:THE MACAPAGAL-ARROYO ADMINISTRATION The MacapagalsArroyo administration faced the difcult task of normalizing polit- ical and economic conditions after the excesses and inadequacies of the previous Estrada administration. To some degree, the greater professionalism and back-to- business mien of the Macapagal-Arroyo cabinet represented a welcome change. Corruption, even as it persisted, was kept within bounds and did not reach the insti- tutionally disruptive scale experienced under Estrada. In terms of macroeconomic management, the country even appeared to regain a semblance of balance. The rst- year budget deficit was kept under control, reversing the past administration's stance of decit spending. Ination continued on a downward path to historically low lev- els of below 5% by the end of 2001, and pressures on the peso abated, allowing interest rates to be reduced in line with worldwide rates. Economically, however, the most serious challenge was the sharp recession that gripped the United States and most of the world in the wake of the tenurist attacks of September 2001.45 Philippine exports dropped drastically, and manufacturing shrank. As a result, the strong recovery awaited after Estrada's removal failed to materialize. Even so, the Philippines posted positive growth based on continuing growth in services and agriculture, faring better than more export-dependent neigh bors like Malaysia and Singapore. Such elements in themselves were sufcient to reconcile most of the business community to the administration, and by early 2002 a mood of cautious optimism had begun to spread among both domestic and over- seas investors. It was another questionas it had been earlier for Aquinoas to what extents. simple reversion to normalcy would suffice to meet growing cynicism and impa- tience among the lower classes for concrete improvements in their lives. This dis junction between business perceptions and lower-class expectations was partly manifested in the periodic threats of pro-Estrada forces to launch massive anti-gov- ernment demonstrations based on the disaffection of the poor, particularly in urban areas. It was clear even to the administration that the manifestly respectable eco- nomic growth under the circumstancesof 3.4% GDP growth amid a weakening world economywould hardly sufce to reduce poverty significantly. Moreover, any n'ther growth acceleration approaching East Asian trends was unlikely unless deeper structural problems were resolvedincluding low saving, low agricultural productivity, high population growth, inferior infrastructure, property rights issues, industrial concentration, and political underdevelopment, as Well as public sector inefciency and corruption. Since the Aquino and Ramos administrations, the need to craft a national response to globalization and locational competition had provided a rough national reform agenda around which many social groups could rally. The actual experience of growth had rendered that vision at least plausible. The weak- ening world economy, however, knocked the wind out of the globalization agenda (at least for the moment), depriving the administration of a ready intellectual vehi- cle for mastering national unity. With avenues for growth receding, the national