Answered step by step
Verified Expert Solution
Question
1 Approved Answer
Questions on microeconomics, provide solutions for the same. (p 500) 212 (HMO, p; healthy) (p 1000)2 u2(full insurance, p; healthy) (p 1000)2 (HMO , p;
Questions on microeconomics, provide solutions for the same.
(p 500) 212 (HMO, p; healthy) (p 1000)2 u2(full insurance, p; healthy) (p 1000)2 (HMO , p; not healthy) (p 2000)2 u2(full insurance, p; not healthy) (a) Does the model have a separating PBE where only the unhealthy workers buy full (b) For what values of q does this model have a pooling PBE where all types of player I buy full imsurance? (c) Suppose that rather than there being just two types of player I there are a continuum of ptsible types. In particular, assume that player I observes his expected health care expenditures for the year before making his health plan choice and that player 2's prior is that these are uniformly distributed on [O, 20001. What kinds of equilibria seem like they might be possible in this model? Show that there is no PBE in which player I buys full insurance with positix-e probability. (d) What does this model suggest about the dangers of a free market in health insurance? What modifications to the model would be if you wanted to think about the inefficiency of health insurance more seriously?
Step by Step Solution
There are 3 Steps involved in it
Step: 1
Get Instant Access to Expert-Tailored Solutions
See step-by-step solutions with expert insights and AI powered tools for academic success
Step: 2
Step: 3
Ace Your Homework with AI
Get the answers you need in no time with our AI-driven, step-by-step assistance
Get Started