Questions: Q2. Prepare the WC Schedule and calculate the change in WC on YoY basis for the
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Questions:
Q2. Prepare the WC Schedule and calculate the change in WC on YoY basis for the forecasted years, as per the information given in Exhibit 8. (You may take appropriate historical assumptions, just mention them properly)
Q3. Calculate the Cost of Equity. Assume the Equity Risk Premium to be 8.88%. (Hint: In this question you need to calculate the Cost of Equity using Unlevered Beta rather than Levered Beta, given in the case. Read about Unlevered Beta and how to calculate it.)
Q4. Compute the growth rate of the firm (Hint: Growth Rate = Reinvestment Rate * ROIC; take Reinvestment Rate = 26.54%)
Q5. Compute the value of the firm using the information given in Exhibit 8. (Hint: You don't need to subtract interest from EBITDA) [ FCF = EBITA*(1-T) + Dep - WC - CapEx ] (Don't forget to add PV of TV)
Bonus Ques: You may leave this if you want to. The value that you computed in Q5 is actually of the unlevered firm. Compute the value of the levered firm by reading about APV. (Hint: Value of Levered Firm = Value of Unlevered Firm + Tax Shield [Debt*Tax] )
SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY BUYOUT
In early November 1999, Stephen Luczo, president and chief executive officer of Seagate Technology, Inc. ("Seagate"'), met with representatives of the private equity firm Si1ver Lake Partners L.P. to discuss a major restructuring proposal. Seagate was one of the world's largest manufacturers of computer disk drives and related data storage devices, with approximately $6.5 billion in annual revenues. The restructuring contemplated a leveraged buyout of Seagate's disk drive operations, followed by the tax-free acquisition of Seagate's remaining assets by VERITAS Software Corporation, an independent manufacturer of storage management software. Besides the disk drive operations, Seagate's main asset was a significant ($21 billion) stake in VERITAS's common stock. Management and Silver Lake believed the two-step transaction could generate significant wealth gains for Seagate shareholders. The need to take some action had become increasingly apparent since late summer, when, following a major run-up in VERITAS's stock price, the market value of Seagate's VERITAS stake had come to
substantially exceed Seagate's entire market capitalization. Management attributed this "value gap" to two factors. First, the company would incur a significant tax liability if it attempted to monetize its VERITAS stake by selling the shares, and this liability was capitalized in Seagate's stock price. Second, the company's core disk drive operations were not receiving full value in the stock market, which currently favored Internet businesses and companies that manufactured cheaper data storage hardware. The proposed transaction was designed to allow Seagate shareholders to realize full value for the company, by distributing the VERITAS stock tax-free, and by selling the disk drive operations at fair market value.
The transaction raised a number of thorny issues, however. First was the question of how much the investors should pay to acquire Seagate's disk drive operations. Since Seagate was a public company, Luczo and the other company directors had a fiduciary duty to obtain a fair price for their shareholders in the sale. However, Silver Lake and its co-investors had to earn a rate of return on their investment that would adequately compensate them for the risks they would incur, and Luczo and other key senior Seagate executives would continue to manage the disk drive business.
A second issue was how the buyout should be financed since this would directly determine the capital structure of the new Seagate. This was a pioneering transaction in the emerging area of technology buyouts, and traditional buyout financial structures might not be appropriate.
Third, the deal had to address the needs and concerns of VERITAS, as an essential participant in the transaction. The terms of the second-stage merger, therefore, had to be attractive to VERITAS shareholders as well. Without their consent, the restructuring could not be done.
Finally, Seagate's board had considered several alternative options for addressing the company's low stock price. These included repurchasing Seagate stock and selling off part of the VERITAS stake, undertaking a tax-free spin-off of either the disk drive business or the entire VERITAS stake, and selling Seagate as a whole. The Silver Lake transaction had to be approved by both Seagate and VERITAS shareholders, so it was necessary to show that the transaction dominated these alternative restructuring options.
Negotiations among Silver Lake, Seagate, VERITAS, and their advisors continued through March 2000. The transaction was extremely complicated, and there was no guarantee that deal terms could be found that would be acceptable to all parties.
The Disk Drive Industry
Hard disk drives were the most common medium for storing electronic information and data, thus making them the largest sector of the information storage industry. Disk drives were integrated into various products, largely classified into three main markets:
- Desktop: The desktop market included all desktop personal computers, targeted for
either home or business use. For the most part, performance attributes (speed capacity, etc.) and quality were standardized across disk drive manufacturers. Furthermore, there was little disk drive brand awareness at the PC consumer level. As a result, disk drives had become commodities and manufacturers competed largely on price. Gross margins in the desktop sector were around 10-15%.
- Enterprise: The enterprise market included high-performance workstations, servers, minicomputers, mainframes, and redundant arrays of inexpensive drive (RAID) subsystems. Because most applications and software that ran on enterprise systems were highly computation- and data-intensive (such as CAD/CAM, the science of these disk drive products emphasized performance and reliability, as well as price, as key selling points. The enterprise market was characterized by higher value-added products than those in the desktop market, with higher average gross margins of 20-25%.
- Mobile: The mobile market included laptop computers, hand-held computers, and personal digital assistants. Mobile disk drives differed from desktop drives in that they were smaller, and were made from more durable materials. Profit margins were higher than in the desktop segment, as products competed on not only price but also durability and power consumption. In the long run, however, analysts expected the markets for mobile and desktop drives to converge.
Table A summarizes worldwide market shares for the major disk drive manufacturers. Six firms accounted for 95% of all sales. The competition was intense, with manufacturers fighting for a limited number of major customers. These customers would normally do business with only two or three disk drive suppliers at a time. At the beginning of each new product cycle, which usually lasted from 6 to 12 months, customers would pre-select
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