QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE CASE STUDY - BP and the Deepwater Horizon Disaster of 2010By Christina Ingersoll, Richard M. Locke, Cate ReavisApril 3, 2012QUESTION 1 Overview the case study in BP's operations management and analyze the issues to determine the core problem that led to the Deepwater Horizon DisasterQUESTION 2 Observe the operational culture of BP and the relationships with its contractors. Analyze Macondo's project decisions that lead to the well oil leak from the views of a) Halliburton cement contractor Jesse Marc Gagliano b) Transocean's Chief Electronics Technician Mike Williams and BP's Decision Makers for the projectQUESTION 3 Evaluate the impact of the supply-chain reactions from the Deepwater Horizon Disaster using the Supply-Chain Decisions Impact Strategy and other related theories or models. Focus on Macondo's Project supply chain reactions from the procurement of inventories until the environmental outcome of the Deepwater Horizon DisasterQUESTION 4 If you are the risk management committee assigned to investigate the consequences from the Deep Horizon Disaster, formulate a strategic forecasting analysis using related theories or formulas to overcome such disaster. Focus on the environmental and economic perspectives in the forecasting analysis approach

SECTION A: CASE STUDY BP and the Deepwater Horizon Disaster of 2010 By Christina Ingersoll, Richard M. Locke, Cate Reavis April 3, 2012 Case Synopsis As of 2010, the Deepwater Horizon disaster was the largest marine oil spill ever to occur in U.S. waters. By the time the well was capped on July 15, 2010, nearly five million barrels of oil (205.8 million gallons) had spilled into the Gulf of Mexico. Federal science and engineering teams revised their estimates on the rate of oil flow several times, and in August they concluded that between April 20 and July 15, 53,000-62,000 barrels per day spilled into the Gulf, an amount that was equivalent to a spill the size of the 1989 Exxon Valdez every four to five days. Before the Deepwater Horizon disaster, the Exxon Valdez held the record for the largest spill in U.S. waters. It was surprising to many analysts how such a disaster could happen, particularly involving a company's operation like BP, which publicly prided itself on its commitment to safety. It did seem clear that, in an effort to close up the Macondo well, several key decisions were made, each involving multiple stakeholders and trade-offs of time, money, safety, and risk mitigation. The public debate began immediately on whether the result of these decisions indicated operational or management problems on the rig, and whether these problems were endemic to the supply-chain reaction of the oil industry or resided within BP itself. To help answer these questions, several task forces were formed to investigate the root causes of the disaster and who among the various players involved with the Macondo well bore responsibility for the disaster and for its resolution. Introduction The company that would become BP was founded in 1909 as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) shortly after Englishman William Knox D'Arcy struck oil in Iran after an eight-year search. In its early years, profitability proved elusive for APOC and, in 1914, Winston Churchill, who was head of the British Navy and believed Britain needed a dedicated oil supply, convinced the British government to buy a 51% stake in the nearly bankrupt company. 3