Read the Case: How a Distance of 10 Feet Can Be Fatal, Parts 1 and 2. Part 1 can be found in your Crisis Management text book at the beginning of Chapter 2. Part 2 can be found in your Crisis Management text book at the end of Chapter 2.

Answer the following questions.(five hundred words, please... thank you!)

Part 1

Ghent, West Virginia, is a small community near the Winterplace Ski Resort on Flat Top Mountain. The Little General Store is located about a mile away from the resort on U.S. 19, a two-lane highway that connects Ghent to nearby Beckley, West Virginia. For years, the Little General Store was the hub of the community. It was a typical convenience store with gas pumps, a small grocery store, and a pizza shop. Locals and skiers frequented the Little General for gas, coffee, some friendly conversation, and quick groceries. That all changed at 10:53 A.M. on January 30, 2007, when a propane tank exploded behind the store, killing four people and injuring five others (Busick, 2012). The store was leveled in the blast. Today, the area is vacant, save for the memorials that have been placed to honor those who died. The Little General Store never reopened in that location.

The Little General Store had a fatal design flaw that existed for years before it was finally uncovered. The flaw was not with the building or the gas pumps, but with the location of a 500-gallon propane tank used to heat the ovens to bake the pizza in the store. The propane tank was located adjacent to the back of the store, only inches from the outer wall of the building. However, the West Virginia Fire Commission and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) required a tank of 500 gallons or more to be located at least 10 feet from the building (U.S. Chemical Safety Board [CSB], 2008).

The Explosion What was supposed to occur that morning was a simple propane transfer between tanks. Two technicians from the Appalachian Heating Company were performing the liquid transfer from a 500-gallon tank located next to the building to another tank located 10 feet away from the structure. The tank adjacent to the building was owned and operated by the Ferrellgas Company and had been in that location since 1994. The new tank was operated by Appalachian Heating, which was taking over the contract to supply propane to the store (CSB, 2008).

At some point in the morning, the lead technician (who had one and a half years of experience with propane) left to service another call, leaving the junior technician (who had about six weeks of experience on the job) to work alone. At 10:25 A.M., the junior technician attempted to extract the plug from the old tank, and propane began to spew out uncontrollably. The technician was not able to stop the flow. The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Report describes what happened next:

Liquid propane sprayed upward, against the roof overhang, and dense propane gas accumulated at ground levels around the tank and the foundation of the building. Over the next 25 minutes, the escaping propane entered the Little General store through openings in the roof overhang. (CSB, 2008, p. 5)

The dissipation of propane inside and around the store was creating a deadly situation. If the propane encountered an open flame in a pizza oven, or an electrical spark, certain detonation would occur. At 10:40 A.M., the junior technician called 911 and alerted the lead technician of the problem by phone. The Ghent Volunteer Fire Department responded with a captain and two emergency medical technicians (EMTs). The lead technician for Appalachian Heating also returned to the store. Meanwhile, there were still four employees inside the store, which was now accumulating a dangerous quantity of propane.

At approximately 10:53 A.M., the worst-case scenario occurred, an explosion that leveled the store. The two technicians, a former captain of the Ghent Fire Department and an EMT were killed. All were standing outside near the leaking propane tank. The four store employees, a firefighter, and another EMT were injured (Busick, 2010). The blast was so forceful that it registered on seismographs at Virginia Tech, some 50 miles away (Heyman, 2007). Ben Monast, the manager at the nearby ski shop, was seated at his desk and felt the concussion from the blast in his chest. "I thought we'd been hit by lightning. ... The whole place shook pretty violently" (Urbina, 2007, p. 12).

The Grieving For the small community of 800 residents, the event was devastating. This is an area where everybody knows everybody else, and many in the community are lifelong residents. "For us, it's just like 9/11," commented Roy Coalson, a volunteer firefighter for 25 years for the Ghent Fire Department (Heyman, 2007, p. 19). William Manning, a bartender at the nearby Bear Den, remarked, "I don't cry over things easily. ... They're my best friends. I've known these people most of my life. You can't replace them" (Urbina, 2007, p. 12). For Governor Joe Manchin III, the explosion was yet another event that had made his tenure in office a difficult one. Only a year earlier, 12 coal miners had died in an accident at the Sago Coal Mine in Sago, West Virginia. That accident too, was caused by a dangerous gas, methane, a sinister vapor that is a continual threat to coal miner safety (Madsen, 2009).

Part 2

The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board investigated the accident at the Little General Store in September 2008 and issued an 84-page report on the incident. Not surprisingly, the board found that the location of the propane tank adjacent to the building contributed to the explosion (CSB, 2008). However, the propane tank under question had been allowed to remain in its location for 11 years. Records indicate that the tank was installed in late 1994 against the back wall of the Little General Store by the then-Southern Sun Company (CSB, 2008). It was not until that fateful day on January 30, 2007, when the old tank was to be decommissioned, that a new tank would be located at the required 10-foot distance level. Ironically, it was this move to secure a safer location that led to the explosion.

The board identified a second factor in the accident. The junior technician was not properly trained to conduct a liquid propane transfer. In addition, he was working alone when he attempted to remove the plug from the propane tank. OSHA regulations require that an attendant be present during the transfer and that the technician be properly trained to undertake such a transfer (Busick, 2010).

The report also noted that although propane had seeped into the store and was noticed by employees because of its odor, no evacuation ever took place. Propane is an odorless liquid and must be given a characteristic odor so it can be detected at one-fifth of its explosive limit (Busick, 2010).

The board also uncovered a defect in the propane tank itself; a withdrawal valve positioned underneath the outer plug was stuck in the open position. Hence, when the junior technician attempted to remove the outer plug, the propane escaped unabated. Under normal circumstances, removing the plug should not release any propane. However, as a safety requirement, the plug has a slot that releases a small amount of propane when the plug is partially opened. This device is meant to signal to the technician that the valve underneath is stuck and the outer plug must be replaced. Unfortunately, the junior technician had not been trained on how to remove the outer plug properly, or to note that a small amount of escaping gas indicates a problem with the withdrawal valve. Instead, the technician completely removed the plug, which allowed the propane to escape under high pressure (CSB, 2008). At that point, it was not possible to replace the outer plug, and the gas escaped freely for nearly 20 minutes.

A complete evacuation of the building and the surrounding area should have occurred. Instead, emergency personnel and employees were located in areas laden with propane fumes. At 10:53 A.M., the propane encountered a flame from a pizza oven, an electrical spark, or another source of ignition. The trigger to the explosion was never identified.

An added irony in this case was that Appalachian Heating was working with a competitor's tank. That tank, owned by Ferrellgas, had to be disconnected so that Appalachian could connect its tank to the building. Ideally, a liquid transfer by which the propane is transferred safely to another tank should be done in a bulk plant. However, that process can be done in the field if the proper safety precautions are met and the technicians are trained (Johnston, 2008). Unfortunately, that was not to be the case in this incident.

Greg Darby is the owner of the Little General Stores and acknowledges it was one of the worst days of his life. "It was a tough day. We went out there, and it was completely gone. It was scary. We didn't know what happened or who died. It was the most difficult thing" (Lannom, 2012, p. 9). Darby grew up in Beaver, West Virginia, only a few miles from the ill-fated Little General Store. He graduated from West Virginia University with a degree in accounting. His first job was with Little General as an accountant, and he has remained there for his entire career. When he first started with the company, the chain had only eight stores; today, it has more than 100. Today, a memorial to the victims of the tragedy sits in the location where the Little General once operated.

1. What steps should be taken to ensure that proper training occurs for employees working with hazardous substances?

2. In this accident, which organizations are potentially liable for the explosion? List these in order of priority and discuss your reasons.