Refer to the accompanying game. High Firm A (13:9) (1518} High Price (16,?) (11,11) What are the Nash equilibrium strategies for rm A and rm E, reepectively, in a oneshot game? Multiple Choice l . [low price. low price} 0 [high price, high price] 0 [low price, high price} 0 [low price. low price} and {high price, high price} The accompanying graph depicts a normal-form game of price competition. Firm B Low Price High Price Firm A Low Price 0,0 25, -5 High Price -5, 25 10, 10 What is the maximum interest rate that can sustain collusion?\fThe accompanying graph depicts a normal-form game of price competition. What is the maximum interest rate that can sustain collusion? Firm B Low Price High Price Firm A Low Price 0,0 (12, -2) High Price (-2, 12) (3, 3)\fRefer to the accompanying normalform game of advertising depicted here. Firm B . Do Not advertise Fle A $9: $9 $175: $199 Do Not Advertise $189, $175 $125, $125 Suppose there is a 20 percent chance that the advertising game depicted shown above will end in the next period. What is the present value to firm 8 of cheating on the collusive strategv? \fRefer to the accompanying payoff matrix. Player 2 t1 t2 t3 Player 1 51 22,0 15, 1 8, -100 52 20, 200 10, 5, -50 The dominant strategy of player 1 isO S1. O S2. O S1 and S2. O nonexistent