Review the case exceprt from Garnett v. Statebelow You should rely on the facts of the case provided in the text when you analyze your initial post in response to the following prompt:

You will need to go back in time before Garnett was charged. You are the prosecutor and have the ability to decide whether you will bring charges against Garnett.

In your role as prosecutor, you may consider any or all of the following factors:

• Harm done to victim
• Vindicating legislative intent in enacting the law
• Potential for deterence (specific and/or general)
• Blameworthiness of Garnett's conduct
• Role of prosecutor (for example - resources needed for trial, whether you believe a jury would convict Garnett, that in the U.S. most prosecutors are elected officials and accountable to the voters, any other practical considerations)

Garnett v. State

Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1993.332 Md. 571, 632 A.2d 797.

Synopsis

Defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court, Montgomery County, William C. Miller, J, of second-degree rape under statute proscribing sexual intercourse between persons under 14 and another at least four years older than victim. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals,329 Md. 601, 620 A.2d 940,granted certiorari prior to intermediate appellate review by Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Appeals,Murphy, C.J., held that second-degree rape statute prohibiting sexual intercourse with underage persons defines strict liability offense that does not require state to prove mens rea, and makes no allowance for mistake-of-age defense.

MURPHY, JUDGE. Maryland's "statutory rape" law prohibiting sexual intercourse with an underage person is codified in Maryland Code Art. 27, 463, which reads in [part]:

Second degree rape.

(a) What constitutes.A person is guilty of rape in the second degree if the person engages in vaginal intercourse with another person: ...

(3) Who is under 14 years of age and the person performing the act is at least four years older than the victim.

(b) Penalty.Any person violating the provisions of this section is guilty of a felony and upon conviction is subject to imprisonment for a period of not more than 20 years.

761

Subsection (a)(3) represents the current version of a statutory provision dating back to the first comprehensive codification of the criminal law by the Legislature in 1809.6 Now we consider whether under the present statute, the state must prove that a defendant knew the complaining witness was younger than 14 and, in a related question, whether it was error at trial to exclude evidence that he had been told, and believed, that she was 16 years old.

I

Raymond Lennard Garnett is a young retarded man. At the time of the incident in question he was 20 years old. He has an I.Q. of 52. His [school] guidance counselor ... described him as a mildly retarded person who read on the third-grade level, did arithmetic on the fifth-grade level, and interacted with others socially at school at the level of someone 11 or 12 years of age.... Raymond attended special education classes and for at least one period of time was educated at home when he was afraid to return to school due to his classmates' taunting. Because he could not understand the duties of the jobs given him, he failed to complete vocational assignments; he sometimes lost his way to work. As Raymond was unable to pass any of the state's functional tests required for graduation, he received only a certificate of attendance rather than a high-school diploma.

In November or December 1990, a friend introduced Raymond to Erica Frazier, then aged 13; the two subsequently talked occasionally by telephone. On February 28, 1991, Raymond, apparently wishing to call for a ride home, approached the girl's house at about nine o'clock in the evening. Erica opened her bedroom window, through which Raymond entered; he testified that "she just told me to get a ladder and climb up her window." The two talked, and later engaged in sexual intercourse. Raymond left at about 4:30 a.m. the following morning. On November 19, 1991, Erica gave birth to a baby, of which Raymond is the biological father.

Raymond was tried before the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on one count of second degree rape under 463(a)(3).... At trial, the defense twice proffered evidence to the effect that Erica herself and her friends had previously told Raymond that she was 16 years old, and that he had acted with that belief. The trial court excluded such evidence as immaterial, explaining [that statutory rape is a strict liability offense]. The court found Raymond guilty. It sentenced him to a term of five years in prison, suspended the sentence and imposed five years of probation, and ordered that he pay restitution to Erica and the Frazier family....

II

... Section 463(a)(3) does not expressly set forth a requirement that the accused have acted with a criminal state of mind, or mens rea. The state insists that the statute, by design, defines a strict liability 762offense, and that its essential elements were met in the instant case when Raymond, age 20, engaged in vaginal intercourse with Erica, a girl under 14 and more than 4 years his junior. Raymond replies that the criminal law exists to assess and punish morally culpable behavior. He says such culpability was absent here. He asks us either to engraft onto subsection (a)(3) an implicit mens rea requirement, or to recognize an affirmative defense of reasonable mistake as to the complainant's age. Raymond argues that it is unjust, under the circumstances of this case which led him to think his conduct lawful, to brand him a felon and rapist.

III

Raymond asserts that the events of this case were inconsistent with the criminal sexual exploitation of a minor by an adult. As earlier observed, Raymond entered Erica's bedroom at the girl's invitation; she directed him to use a ladder to reach her window. They engaged voluntarily in sexual intercourse. They remained together in the room for more than seven hours before Raymond departed at dawn. With an I.Q. of 52, Raymond functioned at approximately the same level as the 13-year-old Erica; he was mentally an adolescent in an adult's body. Arguably, had Raymond's chronological age, 20, matched his sociointellectual age, about 12, he and Erica would have fallen well within the four-year age difference obviating a violation of the statute, and Raymond would not have been charged with any crime at all.

The precise legal issue here rests on [the trial court's refusal to entertain] a defense of reasonable mistake of Erica's age, by which defense Raymond would have asserted that he acted innocently without a criminal design. At common law, a crime occurred only upon the concurrence of an individual's act and his guilty state of mind.... The requirement that an accused have acted with a culpable mental state is an axiom of criminal jurisprudence....

To be sure, legislative bodies since the mid-19th century have created strict liability criminal offenses requiring no mens rea. Almost all such statutes responded to the demands of public health and welfare arising from the complexities of society after the Industrial Revolution. Typically misdemeanors involving only fines or other light penalties, these strict liability laws regulated food, milk, liquor, medicines and drugs, securities, motor vehicles and traffic, the labeling of goods for sale, and the like. Statutory rape, carrying the stigma of felony as well as a potential sentence of 20 years in prison, contrasts markedly with the other strict liability regulatory offenses and their light penalties.