Rigby and Eileen are trying to meet up for dinner. Each chooses independently whether to go to Wing Kingdom or to stay home. If they both choose to go to Wing Kingdom, they each get utility of 4. Rigby and Eileen each get 0 utility in all other cases (if either Rigby, Eileen, or both choose to stay home). a. Write down the normal (matrix) form of this game. (2 points) b. Does either player have a dominant strategy? Explain your answer. (1 points) c. Find all Nash equilibria of this game. (3 points) d. Now suppose there is another restaurant choice called Cheezers. Rigby and Eileen each choose independently whether to go to Wing Kingdom, go to Cheezers, or to stay home. If Rigby and Eileen choose to go to different restaurants, they both get 0 utility. If both go to Cheezers, they each get utility of 1. Otherwise, all utilities are the same as before. Write down the normal (matrix) form of this game. (2 points) e. In the game from part (d), does either player have a dominant strategy? Does either player have dominated strategy? Explain your answer. (3 points) f. Find all Nash equilibria of the game from part (d). (6 points)