Right-of-first-refusal1 The owner of an asset wishes to sell the asset. There are two potential buyers, B1 and B2. The seller values the asset at 100 units. In addition, Buyer B1 values the asset at either 150 units or at 200 units, each equally likely. Buyer B2 values the asset at 200 units. All this is common knowledge among the two buyers. Thus, both B1 and B2 know that (i) B2's value is 200 units and that (ii) B1's value for the asset is either 150 units or 200 units, each possibility being equally likely. In addition, B1 knows whether her own value is 150 units or 200 units. There are two variations of this exercise. In each variation, the seller will not sell at a price less than 100. You will play the role of either buyer B1 (last names A - ??) in both variations and buyer B2 (last names ?? - Z) in both variations.2 VARIATION 1: First-price auction The first variation follows the rules of a first-price auction. Buyers B1 and B2 simultaneously submit sealed bids to the seller. Bids less than 100 units never win. The highest bidder to submit a bid greater. What is the Strategy for Buyer2 for variation 1 and 2?