$.$ Robert Michels$$s famous $$iron law of oligarchy$$ is familiar to students of large$-$scale

organizations. According to Michels, every large voluntary organization$$parties$,$ labor

unions, environmental groups, business associations, and so on$$eventually develops

internal decision$-$making procedures that severely limit input from rank$-$and$-$file

members. Important decisions are made by a small band of organizational oligarchs who

tenaciously hold on to their power within the group. Michels claimed that this

inexorable organizational law held true for all groups: $$It is organization which gives

birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the mandataries over the

mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization, says

oligarchy.$22$

Assume that you are skeptical of the iron law of oligarchy. You think that the tendency

toward internal oligarchy is shaped by this independent variable: the degree to which an

organization is outwardly committed to democracy in society at large. Your hypothesis:

In a comparison of organizations, those that are committed to spreading democracy in

society are less likely to be oligarchies than are those that are not committed to

spreading democracy in society. To test this hypothesis, you gather information on $150$

large organizations. You classify $50$ as having a $$weak$$ commitment to the goal of

spreading democracy in society, $50$ as having a $$moderate$$ commitment, and $50$ as

having a $$strong$$ commitment. Each organization is classified further on the dependent

variable: oligarchy or not an oligarchy.