Safe shop and Bert sons must each decide how much to price their turkeys in their flyers that are published in the week before Thanksgiving. They are both choosing between a low price and a high price. The payoff table below shows the profit outcomes for both firms: The Nash equilibrium for this simultaneous decision is for to Safe shop play _ and Bert sons to play _. Now suppose that Sale shop always delivers it's advertisement to the publisher before Bert sons, and somehow Bert sons always gets to see it before they submit their own ad. Construct the game tree for the sequential game in which Safe shop moves first using the information in the payoff table. For the sequential game in part cf. use the roll back method to find the equilibrium decision path Circle this path. Safe shop earns profit of $ _and Bert sons earns profit of $ _ Suppose instead that Bensons makes the first move in a sequential decision game. Construct the game tree below for the sequential game in which Bert sons moves first using the information in the payoff table. For the sequential game in part f, use the roll bock method to find the equilibrium decision path. Sideshow earns profit of $ and Bert sons earns profit of $ _ (safe shop Bert sons. neither firm, both) has a first-mover advantage? _ (safe shop Bert sons. neither firm. both) has a second-mover advantage? In this game we would expect _ (safe shop Bert sons cannot tell) to mow first. Safe shop and Bert sons must each decide how much to price their turkeys in their flyers that are published in the week before Thanksgiving. They are both choosing between a low price and a high price. The payoff table below shows the profit outcomes for both firms: The Nash equilibrium for this simultaneous decision is for to Safe shop play _ and Bert sons to play _. Now suppose that Sale shop always delivers it's advertisement to the publisher before Bert sons, and somehow Bert sons always gets to see it before they submit their own ad. Construct the game tree for the sequential game in which Safe shop moves first using the information in the payoff table. For the sequential game in part cf. use the roll back method to find the equilibrium decision path Circle this path. Safe shop earns profit of $ _and Bert sons earns profit of $ _ Suppose instead that Bensons makes the first move in a sequential decision game. Construct the game tree below for the sequential game in which Bert sons moves first using the information in the payoff table. For the sequential game in part f, use the roll bock method to find the equilibrium decision path. Sideshow earns profit of $ and Bert sons earns profit of $ _ (safe shop Bert sons. neither firm, both) has a first-mover advantage? _ (safe shop Bert sons. neither firm. both) has a second-mover advantage? In this game we would expect _ (safe shop Bert sons cannot tell) to mow first