Second-price sealed-bid auction) There are 9 bidders.Each bidderivalues the object at v_i>0.

The indices are chosen in a way so that v1 > v2 > ... > v9 > 0. Each bidderican submit a bid b_i>= 0.

The bidder whose bid is the highest wins the object. If there are multiple highest bids, then the winner is the bidder whose valuation is the highest (or whose index is the smallest) among the highest bidders.

(For example, if bidder 1 and bidder 2 have the highest bid, then bidder 1 is the winner.)

The winner, say bidder i, gets a payoff v_i- p, where p is the second highest bid (it is equal to the highest bid if there are multiple highest bids). Other losing players all receive zero payoff.

Find an equilibrium in which player 5 wins the object. Explain why it is an equilibrium.