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Suppose that two identical firms produce widgets and that they are the only firms in the market. Their costs are given by C, =60Q, and C2 =60Q2, where Q, is the output of Firm 1 and Q2 is the output of Firm 2. Price is determined by the following demand curve: P = 900 - Q where Q = Q1 + Q2. Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Calculate the profit of each firm at this equilibrium. (For all of the following, enter a numeric response rounded to two decimal places.) When competing, each firm will produce units of output. In turn, each firm will earn profit of $ Suppose the two firms form a cartel to maximize joint profits. How many widgets will be produced? Calculate each firm's profit. Each firm will produce units of output. In turn, each firm will earn profit of $ Suppose Firm 1 were the only firm in the industry. How would market output and Firm 1's profit differ from that found in above? Firm 1 would produce units of output. Firm 1's would earn profit of $ Returning to the duopoly above, suppose Firm 1 abides by the agreement but Firm 2 cheats by increasing production. How many widgets will firm produce? What will be each firm's profits