SimonJ.Michael,adirectorofShockingTechnologies,wastheonlyrepresentativeoftheholdersoftwoclassesofShockingpreferredstock.Overtime,significantdisagreementsbetweenMichaelandtheotherboardmembersaroseoverexecutivecompensationandwhetherpreferredshareholdersshouldhaveincreasedboardrepresentation.Michaelarguedthatthecompany'sgovernanceproblemsneededtoberesolvedbeforeitcouldattractadditionalequityfunding, which the company desperately needed. MichaelunderstoodthatShocking'ssurvivallikelydependeduponalargeinvestmentbyathirdparty,Littelfuse. Michael spoke with Littelfuse to try to align Littelfuse's interests with his. Michael not only sought todissuadeLittelfusefrominvestinginShocking,butalsodisclosedtoLittelfuseShocking'sconfidentialbusinessinformationthatLittelfusewastheonlypotential investor likely to participate in the necessary fundraising.ByinformingLittelfusethattherewereno other options available to Shocking, Michael gave Littelfuse a significantly enhanced strategic bargaining position with Shocking. Michael believed that Shocking's resulting cash crunch would force the rest oftheboardtoimplementhisobjectives,whichhebelieved served the interests of the preferred shareholders. Did Michael breach his fiduciary duty to Shocking?