solve clearly

Q3 (1 point) Refer to the Airline Security example in the notes on Nash equilibrium in Discrete n-player games. Assume all the description given there stays the same, except that, an airlines i's payoff function is: 50 20 X min{sl, 82, . , n s} 5st. How many Nash equilibria does this changed game have? Numerical answer Q4 (1 point) Refer to the Airline Security example in the notes on Nash equilibrium in Discrete n-player games. Assume all the description given there stays the same, except that, an airlines i's payoff function is: 50 + 10 X min{sl, 82, . , n s} 10st. Suppose airlines 1 through n I choose expenditure level 5. Is expenditure level 3 a best response of Airline n? 1) No. It is not a best response. 2)Yes. It is a best response.